

**IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH**

2026:PHHC:003829



112

CRM-M-1385-2026

Ram KishanPetitioner(s)
Versus
State of HaryanaRespondent(s)

Decided on : 14.01.2026

Date of uploading: 14.01.2026

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL

Present: Mr. Ankur Lal, Advocate for the petitioner.

Ms. Mahima Yashpal Singla, Senior DAG, Haryana.

SUMEET GOEL, J. (Oral)

1. Present petition has been filed under Section 482 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter to be referred as 'the BNSS') for grant of pre-arrest/anticipatory bail to the petitioner in case bearing FIR No.263 dated 13.09.2025, registered for the offences punishable under Sections 256, 318(4), 336(2), 336(3), 338, 340, 61, 238, 241 of BNS 2023 and Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption act, at Police Station Central Faridabad, District Faridabad.

2. The gravamen of the FIR reflects that pursuant to confidential letter No. 21792 dated 21.05.2025 issued by the learned District & Sessions Judge, Faridabad, a discreet enquiry was conducted into anomalies noticed in the Postal Traffic Challan Branch of the Sessions Division, Faridabad. The enquiry officer submitted her report vide letter No. 2005 dated 06.06.2025, wherein it was observed that one police official, namely Vipin, deployed for registration of postal traffic challans, was found to have unauthorized access to the CIS systems of various Magistrate Courts. He



failed to furnish any satisfactory explanation, giving rise to suspicion of unfair practices and tampering with traffic challans. The enquiry further revealed that several consigned traffic challans, particularly relating to heavy motor vehicles, were shown as involving minor offences. Upon comparison with the original challans available on official websites, discrepancies in the particulars of offences were noticed, indicating manipulation. A list of forged challans was annexed with the report. During investigation, the owner of vehicle No. HR-51-CN-0965 stated that a sum of ₹11,000/- was paid to Home Guard Sandeep for disposal of a traffic challan. Home Guard Sandeep disclosed that he had transferred ₹9,500/- online to one Pankaj, who in turn stated that payments were made to Home Guard Shubham for disposal of challans. Investigation further revealed that 25 such challans were disposed of in the court of the learned JMJC, Faridabad, and were registered by co-accused Virender, Ahlmal of the said court. It was also found that that co-accused Shubham, in collusion with co-accused Virender, tampered with the sections of offences in traffic challans, thereby causing loss to the State exchequer. Co-accused Shubham was arrested on 16.09.2025 and disclosed receipt of illegal payments through his bank accounts via Phone-Pay and UPI, involving 26 transactions. The allegations are the present petitioner, Ram Kishan are that he acted in collusion with co-accused Shubham and Virender and had also transferred amounts to the bank accounts of co-accused Shubham and accordingly, he was nominated as an accused in the instant FIR.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner is an innocent person and has been falsely implicated in the present case. The petitioner is working as a clerk/munshi in the Court



Complex, Faridabad. The applicant-accused had also worked as a Peon on D.C. rates in Special Court, Faridabad during the period from 2007 to 2009. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has further argued that the petitioner was not having any control over the editing of traffic challans. Learned counsel asserts that in the instant case, the FIR fails to include material facts, which further raised questions about its credibility and fairness. Moreover, the custodial interrogation should not be used as a punitive measure and is justified only when absolutely necessary for the recovery of material evidence. Furthermore, the petitioner is ready to join the investigation and hence no useful purpose would be served by sending him behind the bars. It is lastly submitted by the learned counsel that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be granted the concession of the anticipatory bail.

4. *Per contra*, learned State Counsel has vehemently opposed the grant of anticipatory bail to the petitioner by arguing that the allegations against the petitioner are grave and serious in nature. The petitioner in collusion with other co-accused had allegedly tampered the traffic challans. The petitioner had also transferred the amount from his bank account in the account of the co-accused. Learned State counsel has iterated that the custodial interrogation of the petitioner is imperative for the purpose of effective and fair investigation and to unearth the case of the prosecution. According to learned State counsel, in case the petitioner is granted the concession of pre-arrest, at this stage, it may impede the ongoing investigation.

5. I have heard the learned counsel for the rival parties and have gone through the available record of the case.

6. It would be apposite to refer herein to a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court titled as *Kishor Vishwasrao Patil vs. Deepak Yashwant Patil and another* passed in *SLP(Crl) No.1125-2022*, relevant whereof reads as under:

“74. Ordinarily, arrest is a part of the process of the investigation intended to secure several purposes. There may be circumstances in which the accused may provide information leading to discovery of material facts and relevant information. Grant of anticipatory bail may hamper the investigation. Pre-arrest bail is to strike a balance between the individual's right to personal freedom and the right of the investigating agency to interrogate the accused as to the material so far collected and to collect more information which may lead to recovery of relevant information.

75. Observing that the arrest is a part of the investigation intended to secure several purposes, in **Adri Dharan Das v. State of W.B.** [**Adri Dharan Das v. State of W.B.**, (2005) 4 SCC 303 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 933], it was held as under : (SCC p. 313, para 19)

“19. Ordinarily, arrest is a part of the process of investigation intended to secure several purposes. The accused may have to be questioned in detail regarding various facets of motive, preparation, commission and aftermath of the crime and the connection of other persons, if any, in the crime. There may be circumstances in which the accused may provide information leading to discovery of material facts. It may be necessary to curtail his freedom in order to enable the investigation to proceed without hindrance and to protect witnesses and persons connected with the victim of the crime, to prevent his disappearance, to maintain law and order in the locality. For these or other reasons, arrest may become an inevitable part of the process of investigation. The legality of the proposed arrest cannot be gone into in an application under Section 438 of the Code. The role of the investigator is well defined and the jurisdictional scope of interference by the court in the process of investigation is limited. The court ordinarily will not interfere with the investigation of a crime or with the arrest of the accused in a cognizable offence. An interim order restraining arrest, if passed while dealing with an application under Section 438 of the Code will amount to interference in the investigation, which cannot, at any rate, be done under Section 438 of the Code.”



76. In Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra [Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 1 SCC 694 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 514], the Supreme Court laid down the factors and parameters to be considered while dealing with anticipatory bail. It was held that the nature and the gravity of the accusation and the exact role of the accused must be properly comprehended before arrest is made and that the court must evaluate the available material against the accused very carefully. It was also held that the court should also consider whether the accusations have been made only with the object of injuring or humiliating the applicant by arresting him or her.

77. After referring to Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre [Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 1 SCC 694 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 514] and other judgments and observing that anticipatory bail can be granted only in exceptional circumstances, in Jai Prakash Singh v. State of Bihar [Jai Prakash Singh v. State of Bihar, (2012) 4 SCC 379 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 468], the Supreme Court held as under : (SCC p. 386, para 19)

“19. Parameters for grant of anticipatory bail in a serious offence are required to be satisfied and further while granting such relief, the court must record the reasons therefor. Anticipatory bail can be granted only in exceptional circumstances where the court is *prima facie* of the view that the applicant has falsely been enrobed in the crime and would not misuse his liberty. (See D.K. Ganesh Babu v. P.T. Manokaran [D.K. Ganesh Babu v. P.T. Manokaran, (2007) 4 SCC 434 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 345], State of Maharashtra v. Mohd. Sajid Husain Mohd. S. Husain [State of Maharashtra v. Mohd. Sajid Husain Mohd. S. Husain, (2008) 1 SCC 213 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 176] and Union of India v. Padam Narain Aggarwal [Union of India v. Padam Narain Aggarwal, (2008) 13 SCC 305 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 1].)”

Economic offences

78. Power under Section 438 CrPC being an extraordinary remedy, has to be exercised sparingly; more so, in cases of economic offences. Economic offences stand as a different class as they affect the economic fabric of the society. In Directorate of Enforcement v. Ashok Kumar Jain [Directorate of Enforcement v. Ashok Kumar Jain, (1998) 2 SCC 105 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 510], it was held that in economic offences, the accused is not entitled to anticipatory bail.”

15. In Sushila Agrawal and others v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Another reported in (2020) 5 SCC 1, Constitution Bench of this Court held that while considering an application for grant of pre-arrest bail the Court has to consider the nature of the offence, the role of the person, the

likelihood of his influencing the course of investigation, or tampering with evidence or likelihood of fleeing justice. The Court held:-

“92.4. Courts ought to be generally guided by considerations such as the nature and gravity of the offences, the role attributed to the applicant, and the facts of the case, while considering whether to grant anticipatory bail, or refuse it. Whether to grant or not is a matter of discretion; equally whether and if so, what kind of special conditions are to be imposed (or not imposed) are dependent on facts of the case, and subject to the discretion of the court.”

7. As per the allegations set forth in the FIR, serious charges have undeniably been levelled against the present petitioner. As per the case set up by prosecution, the petitioner had made payment in the bank account of the co-accused for getting disposed of the traffic challans by way of editing the same. As per submissions made by learned State counsel, the investigation is still at a preliminary stage, and custodial interrogation of the present petitioner is necessary to unravel the truth. The learned counsel for the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the case registered against him is false.

No cause *nay* plausible cause has been shown, at this stage, from which it can be deciphered that the petitioner has been falsely implicated into the present FIR.

8. It is befitting to mention here that while considering a plea for grant of anticipatory bail, the Court has to equilibrate between safeguarding individual rights and protecting societal interest(s). The Court ought to reckon with the magnitude and nature of the offence; the role attributed to the accused; the need for fair and free investigation as also the deeper and wide impact of such alleged iniquities on the society. It is imperative that every person in the Society can expect an atmosphere free from foreboding



& fear of any transgression. At this stage, there is no material on record to hold that *prima facie* case is not made out against the petitioner. The material which has come on record and preliminary investigation, appear to be established a reasonable basis for the accusations. Thus, it is not appropriate to grant anticipatory bail to the petitioner, as it would necessarily cause impediment in effective investigation. In *State v. Anil Sharma* [*State v. Anil Sharma, (1997) 7 SCC 187 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 1039*], the Supreme Court held as under : (SCC p. 189, para 6)

“6. We find force in the submission of CBI that custodial interrogation is qualitatively more elicitation-oriented than questioning a suspect who is well-ensconced with a favourable order under Section 438 of the Code. In a case like this, effective interrogation of a suspected person is of tremendous advantage in disinterring many useful informations and also materials which would have been concealed. Success in such interrogation would elude if the suspected person knows that he is well protected and insulated by a pre-arrest bail order during the time he is interrogated. Very often interrogation in such a condition would reduce to a mere ritual. The argument that the custodial interrogation is fraught with the danger of the person being subjected to third-degree methods need not be countenanced, for, such an argument can be advanced by all accused in all criminal cases. The Court has to presume that responsible police officers would conduct themselves in a responsible manner and that those entrusted with the task of disinterring offences would not conduct themselves as offenders.”

9. In view of the gravity of the allegations and nature of offence, since the necessity of custodial interrogation would arise for a fair and thorough investigation, this Court is of the considered opinion that the petitioner does not deserve the concession of anticipatory bail in the factual matrix of the case in hand. Moreover, custodial interrogation of the petitioner is necessary for an effective investigation & to unravel the truth. The petition is, thus, devoid of merits and is hereby dismissed.



10. Nothing said hereinabove shall be deemed to be an expression of opinion upon merits of the case/investigation.

11. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed off.

(SUMEET GOEL)
JUDGE

January 14, 2026

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| Whether speaking/reasoned: | Yes |
| Whether reportable: | Yes |