In Re: Summoning of Advocates by Investigating Agencies – Supreme Court Clarifies Scope of Section 132 BSA and Protects Legal Privilege

Case Name: In Re: Summoning Advocates Who Give Legal Opinion or Represent Parties During Investigation of Cases and Related Issues

Citation: Suo Motu Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 2 of 2025 & Ors., 2025 INSC 1275

Date of Judgment/Order: 31 October 2025

Bench: Hon’ble Mr. Justice K. Vinod Chandran

Held: The Supreme Court of India held that investigating agencies cannot summon an advocate merely because they have rendered legal advice or appeared for an accused during investigation. The Court declared that such practice violates the attorney–client privilege under Section 132 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam (BSA), infringes the fundamental right to practise a profession (Article 19(1)(g)), and interferes with the right to effective legal representation guaranteed under Articles 20(3), 21, and 22 of the Constitution. The Court ruled that only in exceptional cases falling within the express statutory exceptions—for example, when a communication is made in furtherance of an illegal act or a crime observed by counsel after engagement—may such a summons issue, and even then only with written approval of a superior officer not below the rank of Superintendent of Police.

Summary: This suo motu proceeding arose after an advocate in Ahmedabad was summoned by the police under Section 179 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) to “explain true facts and circumstances” concerning his client’s criminal case. The High Court of Gujarat refused to quash the summons, prompting the Supreme Court to take cognizance. The reference before the larger Bench framed two issues of public importance—whether an investigating officer may summon a lawyer who merely advises or represents a party, and whether judicial or institutional oversight is required before doing so.

The Court heard extensive arguments from the Bar Council of India, the Supreme Court Bar Association, the Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association, and senior advocates including Mr. Vikas Singh, Mr. Atmaram N.S. Nadkarni, and Mr. Siddharth Luthra. They urged that such summonses are unconstitutional and strike at the core of the attorney–client privilege, which protects all communications made for professional advice. The Attorney General for India and Solicitor General of India agreed that no advocate may be compelled to disclose privileged communications but maintained that an advocate engaged in criminal conduct is not immune from investigation.

After reviewing Indian and comparative jurisprudence—including Greenough (1833 E.R. 618), Upjohn Co. (US 6th Cir.), and Canadian and Indian precedents—the Court reaffirmed that confidentiality between lawyer and client is essential to the administration of justice. It rejected analogies with Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab (2005 6 SCC 1) and Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan (AIR 1997 SC 3011), holding that there is no legislative vacuum requiring new guidelines, since Sections 132–134 BSA already comprehensively protect professional communications.

Decision: The Supreme Court allowed the petitions, holding that the summons issued to the advocate was illegal and unconstitutional. It categorically ruled that an investigating agency, prosecuting agency, or police officer cannot directly summon a lawyer representing a client in a case merely to elicit details about that matter. If, however, the investigating officer has credible information that brings the case within the exceptions under Section 132 BSA, the summons must explicitly record those facts and be issued only after written approval of a superior officer not below the rank of Superintendent of Police. The Court clarified that any such summons is amenable to judicial review under Section 528 BNSS, ensuring sufficient judicial oversight. The Bench further observed that the High Court erred in refusing to quash the impugned summons and reiterated that the power to summon under Sections 175 and 179 BNSS is not absolute; it must be exercised consistent with the constitutional protection against self-incrimination and the statutory privilege of confidential professional communication. The Court directed that the impugned summons be set aside and cautioned all investigative authorities to respect the independence of the Bar and the sanctity of attorney–client relations