Punjab & Haryana High Court Sets Aside Decree of Pre-emption After Death of Sole Authorised Representative of Cooperative Society; Holds Right of Pre-emption Cannot Survive Without Competent Human Agency

Case Name: Balkar Singh and Another v. The Mujhel Joint Farming Co-operative Society Ltd., Tikri
Date of Judgment: 11 December 2025
Citation: RSA-2521-1993
Bench: Hon’ble Ms. Justice Mandeep Pannu

Held: The Punjab and Haryana High Court allowed the Regular Second Appeal and set aside the concurrent judgments decreeing the suit for pre-emption, holding that although the cooperative society continued to retain a fractional share in the joint khewat, the decree for pre-emption could not survive after the death of its sole authorised representative. The Court held that the right of pre-emption is a personal and weak statutory right which must be exercised through a competent living human agency, and once such agency ceased to exist, the decree could not be sustained.

Summary: The appeal arose from a suit for possession by way of pre-emption filed by the respondent cooperative society in respect of agricultural land situated in village Bhat Majra, Tehsil Guhla. The Trial Court had decreed the suit, holding that the society was a co-sharer in the joint khewat and possessed a superior right of pre-emption. The Lower Appellate Court affirmed the decree.

The defendants assailed the concurrent findings by contending that the society had ceased to be a co-sharer prior to the impugned sale, that the suit was barred by limitation, that the suit had not been instituted by a duly authorised person, and that a juristic person could not maintain a suit for pre-emption. It was further contended that during the pendency of proceedings the society had been ordered to be wound up and its authorised representative had died, leaving no competent person to pursue the litigation.

The High Court examined the record and upheld the factual findings of the Courts below on co-sharership, limitation, and maintainability, noting that the society continued to retain a 1/133 share in the joint holding and that the suit was within limitation. However, the Court found merit in the contention that the decree could not survive due to subsequent events. It noted that the society was a juristic person and could act only through authorised human agency, and that the only authorised representative had died during the pendency of the appeal. No successor, liquidator, or authorised person had appeared to represent the society thereafter.

Relying on settled principles governing the right of pre-emption and precedent holding that such right does not survive the death of the pre-emptor unless an independent right exists, the Court held that the society could no longer be treated as a subsisting litigating entity capable of enforcing a decree for pre-emption.

Decision: The Regular Second Appeal was allowed. The judgments and decrees passed by the Trial Court and the Lower Appellate Court were set aside, and the suit for pre-emption filed by the respondent cooperative society was dismissed.