Case Name: Municipal Committee, Gurgaon v. Smt. Kasturi Devi
Date of Judgment: 27 February 2026
Citation: RSA-2668-1997
Bench: Hon’ble Justice Deepak Gupta
Held: The Punjab & Haryana High Court held that mere sanction of a Town Planning Scheme does not automatically divest private ownership unless the property is clearly shown to be reserved for a public purpose and the scheme is implemented in accordance with law. Where the municipal authority fails to establish precise demarcation of the land within the scheme, the property cannot be treated as having vested in the municipality.
Summary: The Regular Second Appeal was filed by the Municipal Committee, Gurugram challenging the concurrent judgments of the trial court and the first appellate court, which had decreed the suit filed by Smt. Kasturi Devi for permanent injunction in respect of a plot measuring 812 square yards situated in Shivaji Nagar, Gurugram.
The plaintiff claimed ownership and possession of the property on the basis of a family settlement through which the plot had been transferred to her by her husband, Ram Chander. Ram Chander had earlier acquired his share in the larger property through a sale deed executed in 1963 and subsequent mutual arrangements among co-sharers.
The plaintiff asserted that she had applied to the Municipal Committee for sanction of a building plan in May 1984 for raising construction over the plot. According to her, the municipal authority failed to decide the application within the statutory period of two months, which under the Haryana Municipal Act would result in deemed sanction of the building plan. She further alleged that despite this position, the Municipal Committee rejected the application and attempted to treat the plot as municipal land by fencing it and installing signboards.
In response, the Municipal Committee contended that the plot formed part of an open space reserved under Town Planning Scheme No. 6-C and therefore vested in the municipality. It was also argued that the suit was barred by the principle of res judicata because earlier litigation involving the plaintiff’s husband had addressed issues relating to the same property.
The trial court, after examining the evidence, held that the plaintiff had established ownership over the property. It also concluded that although the land was shown in the planning scheme as an open space, the scheme had not been implemented within the statutory period and had therefore lapsed. On that basis, the trial court decreed the suit.
The first appellate court reappreciated the entire evidence and affirmed the plaintiff’s ownership and possession. It observed that the municipal authority had failed to prove the exact location of the property within the Town Planning Scheme or demonstrate that it had been specifically reserved for a public purpose such as a park or street. The appellate court also relied on documentary evidence including revenue records, the sale deed, mutation entries, and the earlier decree recognizing the plaintiff’s rights.
The appellate court further noted that the planning scheme itself had not been implemented within the prescribed statutory period of five years, as no development works such as roads or sewerage had been carried out. Consequently, the scheme was treated as having lapsed under the Haryana Municipal Act.
The High Court observed that both courts below had recorded concurrent findings of fact based on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence. It reiterated that in a second appeal under Section 100 CPC, interference is permissible only when a substantial question of law arises or when findings are shown to be perverse.
On the issue of vesting, the Court held that the burden was on the Municipal Committee to prove that the property formed part of the Town Planning Scheme and had been reserved for a public purpose. The documents produced by the municipal authority were found insufficient to establish clear demarcation of the plot within the scheme area.
The Court also rejected the plea of res judicata. It noted that in the earlier litigation titled Tara Wanti v. Municipal Committee, the plaintiff’s husband had merely been a proforma party and no relief had been claimed against him. Since his rights had not been directly adjudicated in that case, the principle of res judicata could not apply.
Given these circumstances, the High Court held that the concurrent findings of the courts below were based on proper appreciation of evidence and did not suffer from any legal infirmity warranting interference.
Decision: The High Court dismissed the Regular Second Appeal and upheld the decree of permanent injunction granted in favour of the plaintiff restraining the Municipal Committee from interfering with her possession over the suit property.