Punjab & Haryana High Court Denies Bail in NIA Terror Case, Holds Long Incarceration Alone Cannot Override UAPA Restrictions, Section 43D(5) UAPA Prevails

Case Name: Gurwinder Singh @ Baba v. National Investigating Agency, Delhi

Date of Judgment: 27 May 2026

Citation: CRA-D-1084 of 2025

Bench: Hon’ble Mrs. Justice Archana Puri and Hon’ble Mrs. Justice Ramesh Kumari

Held: The Punjab & Haryana High Court held that where accusations under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 are supported by prima facie material, the statutory embargo under Section 43D(5) operates against the grant of bail. Mere long incarceration or delay in trial cannot, by itself, justify bail in cases involving grave terrorist offences, particularly where the accused is alleged to have actively facilitated terrorist activities and there exists a likelihood of witness intimidation or absconding.

Summary: The appellant challenged the order refusing him regular bail in an NIA case arising out of the murder of Shaurya Chakra awardee Comrade Balwinder Singh Sandhu. Initially registered under the IPC and Arms Act, the investigation was subsequently transferred to the National Investigation Agency, which invoked multiple provisions of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act after uncovering an alleged conspiracy involving operatives of the Khalistan Liberation Force and the banned International Sikh Youth Federation.

According to the prosecution, the appellant acted as a close associate of one of the principal conspirators and played an active role by procuring, repairing, transporting and delivering firearms used in the assassination. Digital evidence, including retrieved mobile data, voice sample matching and communications with other accused persons, allegedly established his involvement in the conspiracy. The prosecution further asserted that the appellant had absconded for nearly two years before his arrest and was involved in several other criminal cases.

The appellant contended that he was not named in the FIR, that the evidence against him was insufficient and that he had remained in custody since August 2022 while the trial was progressing slowly. Relying upon Article 21 of the Constitution, he argued that prolonged incarceration entitled him to regular bail. The NIA opposed the plea by relying upon Section 43D(5) of the UAPA and submitted that substantial incriminating material connected the appellant with the terrorist conspiracy and that releasing him posed a serious risk of influencing witnesses and absconding.

The Division Bench extensively considered the statutory restrictions contained in Section 43D(5) of the UAPA and relied upon the Supreme Court’s decisions in Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab, NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali and Kekhriesatuo Tep v. NIA. The Court reiterated that in UAPA cases the test is whether the accusations appear prima facie true, and if this threshold is satisfied, the normal principles governing bail assume a secondary role. Upon examining the chargesheet and the material collected during investigation, the Court found sufficient prima facie evidence indicating the appellant’s role in facilitating arms and logistics for the commission of the terrorist offence.

The Court further held that prolonged custody, though relevant, cannot automatically outweigh the statutory restrictions imposed under Section 43D(5), particularly where the allegations concern terrorism, national security and organised conspiracy. Considering the seriousness of the accusations, the appellant’s alleged conduct of evading arrest, the possibility of influencing witnesses and the existence of multiple other criminal cases, the Court concluded that no case for grant of bail was made out. Nevertheless, it directed the trial court to endeavour to conclude the trial expeditiously in view of the appellant’s period of incarceration.

Decision: The appeal was dismissed, and the order refusing regular bail was affirmed. The High Court held that the statutory embargo under Section 43D(5) of the UAPA applied as the accusations against the appellant were prima facie true. However, the trial court was directed to make every effort to ensure the expeditious conclusion of the trial.