Brutality of Crime Cannot Substitute Proof; Plausible Acquittal Must Stand Even If Another View Is Possible; Benefit of Reasonable Doubt Is a Tenet of Criminal Jurisprudence, Not Mere Judicial Caution: Supreme Court

Case Name: Khalil Pasha & Ors. v. Abdul Rasheed & Anr.

Date of Judgment: 28 July 2026

Citation: 2026 INSC 754

Bench: Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice K. Vinod Chandran

Held: The Supreme Court held that an acquittal fortifies the presumption of innocence, and where the view adopted by the Trial Court is plausible, the acquittal should not be overturned merely because another view of the evidence is possible. A brutal crime cannot lower the prosecution’s burden or permit conviction on assumptions. The Court further held that a recovery under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, even of a weapon carrying human blood, cannot by itself sustain conviction unless connected with other reliable circumstances forming a complete chain pointing exclusively towards guilt. On the procedural issue, it reiterated that after the 2009 amendment introducing the proviso to Section 372 CrPC, a victim having a statutory right of appeal against acquittal ordinarily cannot maintain a revision; however, Section 401(5) empowers the High Court in appropriate circumstances to treat an erroneously filed revision as an appeal.

Summary: The case concerned the alleged murder of Qavi in February 1988. The Trial Court had acquitted the accused after finding serious deficiencies in the prosecution evidence. The deceased’s brother challenged the acquittal by way of criminal revision before the Bombay High Court. The High Court initially interfered without hearing the accused, resulting in a remand by the Supreme Court under Section 401(2) CrPC. On reconsideration, the High Court again remitted the matter to the Sessions Court for fresh consideration of the eyewitness evidence, Section 27 recoveries and chemical-analysis report, though it upheld the Trial Court’s rejection of the alleged dying declarations.

The Supreme Court examined the prosecution evidence itself, considering that the incident was nearly four decades old. It found material deficiencies in the eyewitness accounts. The alleged eyewitnesses were chance witnesses whose versions did not satisfactorily corroborate each other; a material person said to have accompanied one eyewitness throughout was not examined; and unexplained delay existed in recording another witness’s statement. Their conduct after allegedly witnessing the assault also created doubt about their presence at the scene.

The alleged dying declarations were equally doubtful. One doctor stated that the deceased had been brought to hospital unconscious and never regained consciousness, whereas another doctor gave a different account. There were also material inconsistencies regarding who had brought or accompanied the victim to hospital. Further, the alleged scene of occurrence itself was doubtful because despite the victim suffering multiple serious bleeding injuries, the investigating officer made no significant seizure of blood or other tell-tale material from the alleged spot.

Although the weapon recovered under Section 27 carried human blood, the prosecution failed to establish that the blood belonged to the deceased or otherwise reliably connect the weapon with the crime. The Court therefore found that motive, eyewitness testimony, dying declarations and scene-of-crime evidence all remained unreliable, leaving only an isolated recovery incapable of completing the chain of guilt.

Decision: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court’s order of remand and restored the Trial Court’s acquittal. It directed that the accused shall stand acquitted; any accused still in custody was to be released forthwith unless required in another case, while bail bonds of those already on bail were cancelled. The Court stressed that although the murder was undoubtedly brutal and the victim’s brother’s anguish understandable, criminal courts cannot convict where the prosecution evidence fails to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.