Procedure Is the Handmaid of Justice, Not a Sword to Defeat Appeals: Supreme Court Upholds Composite Appeal Against Common Judgment in Two Suits

Case Name: Bassanna Since Deceased by Legal Representatives and Others v. Bhimanna and Others

Date of Judgment: 12 August 2026

Citation: 2026 INSC 838

Bench: Justice Ujjal Bhuyan and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar

Held:  The Supreme Court held that a composite first appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, challenging a common judgment rendered in two consolidated suits filed by the same plaintiff, is maintainable where the appellant has filed certified copies of both decrees, paid the court fees payable on two separate appeals, expressly challenged the adjudication in both suits and sought the setting aside of both decrees.

The mere failure to file a separate memorandum of appeal for each decree is a defect of form and not of substance. Such a procedural deficiency is curable and cannot be treated as fatal to the appeal. If an appellate court considers separate memoranda necessary, it must afford the appellant an opportunity to cure the defect instead of dismissing the appeal or leaving the litigant remediless.

The Court emphasised that the right of appeal is a substantive right that cannot be defeated solely because of a curable procedural defect. Rules of procedure are the handmaid of justice and must not be employed as a sword to terminate proceedings without adjudication on merits. Courts must ordinarily endeavour to decide disputes on their merits rather than allow form to prevail over substance.

The Court clarified that maintainability depends upon the nature of the proceedings and the parties involved. Separate appeals would ordinarily be necessary where different plaintiffs institute separate suits, where a suit and counterclaim are separately decided, or where distinct parties are independently aggrieved. The ruling does not establish that a single appeal is permissible against every common judgment.

Summary: The appellants’ predecessor instituted two civil suits concerning land situated in Survey No. 132/1-A. In the first suit, O.S. No. 14 of 1986, the plaintiff sought a declaration that a registered sale deed dated 16 April 1977, executed by one defendant in favour of another, was null and void and not binding upon him. In the second suit, O.S. No. 135 of 1987, he sought a permanent injunction restraining interference with his possession over a smaller portion of the same property.

At the request of the common defendant and with the plaintiff’s consent, the trial court clubbed the two suits under its inherent powers flowing from Section 151 CPC. Common evidence was recorded because the parties and subject matter were substantially similar. By a common judgment dated 7 December 1990, the trial court dismissed both suits and drew separate decrees.

The plaintiff filed a composite first appeal under Section 96 read with Order XLI Rule 1 CPC. The memorandum expressly challenged the judgment and decrees passed in both suits. Certified copies of both decrees were filed, a request was made to dispense with an additional copy of the common judgment, and the court fees payable for challenging both decrees through separate appeals were fully paid.

The first appellate court entertained the composite appeal and, by its judgment dated 17 August 2007, reversed the trial court’s decision. It declared that the sale deed was not binding upon the plaintiff and granted a permanent injunction restraining interference with his possession.

The defendants filed two second appeals before the Karnataka High Court. Although no objection to the composite appeal had been raised before the first appellate court, the defendants contended in the second appeals that two separate appeals should have been filed against the decrees in the two suits. Accepting this argument, the High Court held that the composite first appeal was not maintainable, set aside the first appellate court’s judgment and restored the dismissal of both suits without adjudicating the substantive dispute.

The Supreme Court found that all essential statutory requirements under Section 96 and Order XLI Rule 1 CPC had been fulfilled. The same plaintiff had instituted both suits; the proceedings had been consolidated at the common defendant’s request; common evidence had been led; both suits had been decided through a common judgment; both decrees were expressly challenged; certified copies of both decrees accompanied the appeal; and the requisite court fees had been paid. The only arguable deficiency was the absence of a separate memorandum of appeal, which was procedural and curable.

Referring to M/s Chitivalasa Jute Mills v. M/s Jaypee Rewa Cement, the Court observed that although the CPC does not expressly provide for consolidation of suits, courts may consolidate proceedings under Section 151 to avoid multiplicity, delay and unnecessary expenditure where substantial similarity exists between the issues. The proviso to Order XLI Rule 1(1) also empowers the appellate court to dispense with more than one copy of the judgment where multiple suits are tried together and disposed of by a common judgment.

Relying upon Charan Singh v. Ram Saroop, the Court held that even where separate memoranda are considered legally necessary, the appellate court must alert the appellant and permit the defect to be cured. Dismissal may become justified only if the appellant fails to correct the defect despite being granted an opportunity. No such opportunity had been afforded in the present case.

Decision: The Supreme Court allowed the civil appeals and set aside the Karnataka High Court’s judgment dated 2 September 2022 in RSA Nos. 3214 and 3215 of 2007. It held that the composite first appeal filed by the plaintiff was maintainable and had rightly been adjudicated on merits by the first appellate court.

Both second appeals were restored to the Karnataka High Court for fresh adjudication on merits. The Supreme Court clarified that it had not examined the parties’ substantive claims concerning the property, sale deed or possession. The parties were directed to bear their own costs, and the pending interlocutory application was disposed of.