Five-Month Delay in Deciding Detenu’s Representation Makes Article 22(5) Safeguard Illusory: Punjab and Haryana High Court Quashes Preventive Detention

Case Name: Bala v. Union Territory, Chandigarh and Others

Date of Judgment: 24 August 2026

Citation: CRWP-1001-2026

Bench: Hon’ble Mr Justice Virinder Aggarwal

Held: The Punjab and Haryana High Court held that unexplained delay at every stage—informing a detenu of the right to make a representation, forwarding the representation, obtaining comments and deciding it—constitutes a flagrant violation of Article 22(5) of the Constitution.

A detenu must be informed, at the earliest possible opportunity, of all authorities to whom a representation may be submitted, including the Central Government. A delay of approximately 45 days in communicating that right cannot be treated as a procedural irregularity because it directly impairs the effective exercise of a substantive constitutional safeguard.

The constitutional obligation does not end with merely informing the detenu of the right to represent. Once a representation is submitted, every authority concerned must transmit, process and decide it with the highest degree of diligence and urgency. In preventive detention matters, each day’s delay assumes significance because personal liberty is curtailed without a prior judicial determination of guilt.

The Court held that the cumulative effect of the 45-day delay in communicating the petitioner’s right, the nearly three-month delay in deciding her representations by the Chandigarh Administration and the delay exceeding five months in deciding her representation by the Central Government rendered her continued detention constitutionally unsustainable.

Summary: The petitioner, Bala, invoked the writ jurisdiction of the Punjab and Haryana High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, seeking a writ of habeas corpus and her immediate release from preventive detention. She challenged the detention order dated 1 November 2025 passed by the Home Secretary, Chandigarh Administration, under Section 3 of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988.

An earlier detention order against the petitioner had been quashed by the Advisory Board in July 2025, resulting in her release. Thereafter, FIR No. 103 dated 4 August 2025 was registered under Section 21 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 against the petitioner and 21 other persons.

According to the petitioner, the FIR was based only on alleged secret information that the accused were engaged in narcotics trafficking. No search was conducted, no contraband was recovered, no accused was arrested and no meaningful investigation allegedly followed. She contended that the FIR was subsequently used merely to manufacture fresh material for another preventive detention order.

The fresh detention order dated 1 November 2025 was stated to be founded substantially on the material underlying the earlier unsuccessful detention, with the subsequent FIR being the only newly introduced circumstance. The Advisory Board confirmed the fresh detention on 16 January 2026, and the detention was directed to continue until 31 October 2026.

The petitioner was informed on 3 November 2025 of her right to make representations to the Home Secretary, the Chief Secretary of the Chandigarh Administration and the Advisory Board. She submitted representations to those authorities on 26 November 2025. However, she was informed of her separate right to make a representation to the Central Government only on 16 December 2025—approximately 45 days after the detention order. She thereafter submitted her representation to the Central Government on 24 December 2025.

The Court found serious delays in processing each of these representations. The Home Department sought comments from the Sponsoring Authority only on 14 January 2026, and the comments were supplied on 30 January 2026. The petitioner’s representations dated 26 November 2025 were ultimately considered by the Chief Secretary and the Home Secretary only in February 2026, after approximately three months.

The representation addressed to the Central Government was forwarded by the Chandigarh Administration on 3 February 2026 but reached the PITNDPS Division only on 16 March 2026. The Central Government sought comments and relevant material on 18 March 2026, which the Chandigarh Administration supplied only on 24 May 2026. The representation was ultimately rejected on 2 June 2026—more than five months after it had been submitted.

The Chandigarh Administration and the Union of India defended the detention by contending that delay does not automatically invalidate preventive detention where it is satisfactorily explained. They maintained that the petitioner’s representations had been duly processed and considered under the statutory framework.

The High Court accepted the legal proposition that every delay does not, by itself, invalidate detention. However, it held that the authorities must offer a cogent and satisfactory explanation showing that the delay resulted from circumstances beyond their control and not from administrative indifference or lack of diligence.

Relying on Alfiya A. v. State of Kerala, the Court held that Article 22(5) places a positive obligation upon the detaining authority to inform the detenu of every person or body to whom a representation may be addressed. The obligation is independent of whether the detenu ultimately acquired knowledge of that right or subsequently submitted a representation. The effectiveness of the safeguard lies in its timely communication.

The Court also relied upon Jaseela Shaji v. Union of India, Sarabjeet Singh Mokha v. District Magistrate, Jabalpur, Tara Chand v. State of Rajasthan, Vijay Kumar v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, Sk. Abdul Karim v. State of West Bengal and Rashid S.K. v. State of West Bengal to reiterate that the right to make a representation is a valuable constitutional right and not an empty formality.

The Court observed that, in an age of instantaneous electronic communication, delays of three and five months in deciding representations could not be justified through routine administrative explanations. The record disclosed delay at every stage and contained no cogent, compelling or legally acceptable explanation commensurate with its magnitude.

Since preventive detention is an exceptional encroachment upon personal liberty and is based on subjective satisfaction rather than proof of an offence, strict observance of procedural safeguards is indispensable. The authorities’ failure to comply with Article 22(5) in its true letter and spirit vitiated the petitioner’s continued detention.

Decision: The High Court allowed the habeas corpus petition and quashed the preventive detention order, along with the petitioner’s consequential continued detention.