Section 313 CrPC Answers Cannot Fill Gaps in Prosecution Evidence: Supreme Court Acquits Man in Child Rape-Murder Case as Last-Seen Evidence and DNA Findings Fail to Establish Guilt

Case Name: Santosh Gurung v. State of Sikkim.

Date of Judgment: 1 October 2026.

Citation: 2026 INSC 1073.

Bench: Justices Ujjal Bhuyan and Atul S. Chandurkar.

Held: The Supreme Court held that an accused’s answers or alleged failure to explain circumstances under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 cannot fill gaps in the prosecution’s evidence or substitute for proof of guilt. An unexplained incriminating circumstance may provide an additional link only where the prosecution has established the circumstances against the accused; it does not shift the prosecution’s burden of proof. Setting aside concurrent convictions for rape, murder, disappearance of evidence and offences under the POCSO Act, the Court found that the last-seen circumstance was doubtful, the recovered remains were not established to belong to the victim, and the forensic evidence did not connect the appellant to the alleged offences.

Summary: Santosh Gurung was convicted under Sections 376(2)(i), 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and Sections 4 and 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, in connection with the disappearance and alleged rape and murder of his minor niece. The Sessions Court sentenced him to life imprisonment, and the Sikkim High Court upheld his conviction.

The prosecution alleged that the appellant took the child from her grandmother’s house on 6 November 2013, despite being refused permission to take her along while purchasing vegetables. A missing report was lodged on 12 November 2013. After the appellant was traced at Siliguri in May 2014, an FIR was registered, and various articles and suspected remains were recovered following his disclosure. The prosecution relied entirely on circumstantial evidence.

Examining each alleged link, the Supreme Court found that the last-seen theory lacked a firm evidentiary foundation. The grandmother was uncertain whether the appellant and the child had left together or separately. Other witnesses, including the Investigating Officer, acknowledged that nobody had seen him taking the child away. The evidence also referred to two other visitors at the house. In addition, approximately six months separated the alleged last-seen incident from the recovery of suspected remains, making reliance on that circumstance unsafe in the absence of other positive evidence.

The Court treated the recovery under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 with caution because the articles were found at a spot frequented by cattle herders and ordinarily visible to visitors. It clarified, through the precedent it relied upon, that accessibility to the public does not by itself render a recovery inadmissible. The relevant distinction is whether the recovered object was concealed or ordinarily visible to others.

The DNA findings substantially undermined the prosecution’s case. The tested bone pieces were of human male origin, whereas the missing child was female, and they were not biologically related to the blood samples supplied by her mother and sister. The recovered bones and teeth were therefore not established to be the victim’s remains.

The remaining forensic evidence also failed to provide the necessary connection. The laboratory could not determine whether the blood on the recovered brown shawl was human or animal blood, could not ascertain the age of the examined scalp hair, and detected no human remains in the soil sample. The shawl’s ownership was not established either.

Rejecting the State’s reliance on the appellant’s Section 313 statement, the Court found no failure on his part to explain an established incriminating circumstance. It reiterated that such a statement is not substantive evidence and cannot repair deficiencies in the prosecution’s case. Since the underlying chain itself was incomplete, the appellant’s responses could not supply an additional link establishing guilt.

The Court concluded that both the Sessions Court and the High Court had failed to account for material infirmities apparent from the record. Although the victim had met an unfortunate end, the prosecution had not established the appellant’s involvement beyond reasonable doubt, entitling him to the benefit of doubt.

Decision: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the Sessions Court’s judgment as affirmed by the Sikkim High Court, and acquitted Santosh Gurung of all offences for which he had been tried and convicted.