Experience as Clerk-cum-Data Entry Operator Cannot Be Counted as Teaching or Research Experience for Assistant Professor Recruitment; Punjab and Haryana High Court Sets Aside Appointment for Awarding Marks Contrary to Selection Criteria
Case Name: Surender v. CCS HAU, Hisar through its Registrar and Others
Date of Judgment: 21 September 2026
Citation: CWP-28581-2017
Bench: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Harpreet Singh Brar
Held: The Punjab and Haryana High Court held that experience acquired as a Clerk-cum-Junior Data Entry Operator cannot be treated as equivalent to teaching, research or extension experience prescribed for recruitment to the post of Assistant Professor merely because such experience was gained in the same University. Where the recruitment advertisement expressly specifies the nature and category of experience eligible for consideration, the Selection Committee is bound to adhere strictly to those criteria and cannot enlarge their scope by awarding marks for administrative or ministerial experience having no nexus with the advertised post.
The Court further held that the discretion ordinarily vested in a Selection Committee does not extend to disregarding or modifying the notified selection criteria. Although the High Court does not ordinarily sit in appeal over the assessment made by an expert Selection Committee, judicial interference under Article 226 of the Constitution is warranted where the selection process demonstrates a palpable departure from the prescribed criteria or where irrelevant experience has been considered in an arbitrary manner.
Applying these principles, the Court held that the award of 10 marks for experience to a candidate who had worked as a Clerk-cum-Junior Data Entry Operator was contrary to the recruitment conditions, which recognised experience in teaching, research or extension in specified instructional and academic capacities. Consequently, the selection and appointment founded upon those marks could not be sustained.
Summary: The Punjab and Haryana High Court, while exercising its writ jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, examined the legality of the selection and appointment of an Assistant Professor at Chaudhary Charan Singh Haryana Agricultural University, Hisar, where the Selection Committee had awarded experience marks to a candidate whose previous employment did not fall within the categories expressly prescribed in the recruitment advertisement.
The petitioner, Surender, challenged the selection and appointment of respondent No. 3, Ms. Sheetal Chaudhary, to the post of Assistant Professor (Computer and ICVT), pursuant to Advertisement No. 1/2016 issued by the respondent-University. The petitioner had participated in the selection process and appeared for an interview on 03.07.2017. Following preparation of the merit list, respondent No. 3 was offered appointment on 20.07.2017 and joined the post on 21.07.2017.
The petitioner contended that the selected candidate had been improperly awarded 10 marks towards experience despite having worked as a Clerk-cum-Junior Data Entry Operator in the University since 22.07.2011. According to the petitioner, the selection criteria specifically contemplated two marks for each year of experience acquired after obtaining a Master’s degree in Teaching, Research or Extension in the cadre of Instructor, including specified temporary appointments such as Research Associate, Training Associate, Technical Assistant, Assistant Professor, STA and Research Fellow.
It was argued that administrative or clerical experience could not be equated with the academic and instructional experience prescribed for the post of Assistant Professor. The petitioner had secured 51.39 marks, while respondent No. 3 had secured 54.6 marks, including the disputed 10 marks awarded for experience. The petitioner consequently sought setting aside of the appointment and revision of the assessment of merit.
The respondent-University and the selected candidate defended the appointment, contending that the assessment of relevant experience fell within the prerogative of the employer and the Selection Committee. It was submitted that the Selection Committee had considered the experience acquired by respondent No. 3 in the University and had deemed it relevant for the advertised post.
Upon examining the recruitment criteria, the High Court observed that the advertisement expressly identified the categories of experience eligible for the award of marks. The experience certificate of respondent No. 3 established that she had worked as a Clerk-cum-Junior Data Entry Operator, a position involving administrative and ministerial functions. Such experience, the Court observed, was fundamentally different from teaching, research, extension or instructional experience recognised under the advertised criteria.
The Court emphasised that employment in the same institution does not, by itself, establish equivalence between two distinct categories of professional experience. The nature of duties performed and their relationship with the requirements of the advertised post are material considerations. Consequently, experience obtained in an administrative capacity could not be treated as qualifying teaching or research experience merely because the candidate had served the recruiting University.
In support of its reasoning, the High Court relied upon Manjeet Ahlawat v. State of Haryana and Another, CWP-24270-2026, decided on 06.08.2026, wherein the Court had examined whether experience obtained in a different post could satisfy the prescribed experience requirement for recruitment. That decision, drawing upon earlier judgments including Kusum v. State of Haryana and Another, CWP-3597-2014, and Ashok Kumar and Others v. State of Haryana and Others, CWP-21410-2012, reiterated that experience acquired in a different professional capacity cannot automatically be equated with the particular experience expressly prescribed under the applicable recruitment conditions.
The Court noted that the aforesaid principle had also been reiterated in Kamlesh v. State of Haryana and Another, CWP-14666-2012, Ajit Kumar v. Haryana School Teachers Selection Board and Another, CWP-19687-2012, and Suman Rani v. State of Haryana and Others, CWP-17881-2012, and affirmed by the Division Bench in Nirmalendu v. State of Haryana and Others, LPA-1206-2012.
Applying the settled principle to the present controversy, the High Court held that the Selection Committee could neither expand the categories of experience specified in the advertisement nor award marks for experience unrelated to the advertised academic position. The Court accordingly found that the 10 marks awarded to respondent No. 3 for her experience as Clerk-cum-Junior Data Entry Operator were legally unsustainable.
Addressing the scope of judicial review in recruitment matters, the Court clarified that while the assessment of candidates ordinarily falls within the domain of the Selection Committee, its decisions remain subject to judicial scrutiny where the prescribed criteria have been disregarded. A selection founded upon irrelevant considerations or a departure from notified eligibility and assessment standards cannot claim immunity merely because it represents the decision of an expert body.
The Court concluded that the impugned selection suffered from a material deviation from the recruitment criteria and that the award of experience marks for administrative employment had directly affected the assessment of merit. Such an appointment could not be permitted to stand.
Decision: The Punjab and Haryana High Court allowed the writ petition and set aside the selection and appointment of respondent No. 3, Ms. Sheetal Chaudhary, as Assistant Professor (Computer and ICVT) at CCS Haryana Agricultural University, Hisar, holding that the award of 10 marks for her experience as Clerk-cum-Junior Data Entry Operator was contrary to the prescribed selection criteria.
The respondent-University was directed to consider the appointment of an eligible and suitable candidate for the post on the basis of the merit prepared by the Selection Committee within three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the judgment.
The Court further held that the petitioner would be entitled to all consequential notional benefits, while actual monetary benefits would become admissible only from the date of his joining.