Case Name: Sanjay Prasad v. Madhusudan Dwivedi & Ors.
Date of Judgment: 14 October 2026
Citation: 2026 INSC 1128
Bench: Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Sheel Nagu.
Held: The Supreme Court held that an intra-court appeal may lie against a Single Judge’s order in contempt proceedings where the order determines substantive rights or addresses the merits of the underlying dispute, provided it satisfies the test of a “judgment” and the applicable Letters Patent or High Court Rules permit such an appeal. Civil contempt proceedings cannot be treated as an exercise of criminal jurisdiction merely because they may culminate in imprisonment or a fine. The Bench also questioned the correctness of Ram Kishan Fauji v. State of Haryana, (2017) , concerning intra-court appeals in writ proceedings arising from criminal matters, and referred the issue for consideration by an appropriate Bench, subject to the Chief Justice of India’s orders.
Summary: The proceedings arose from a recruitment dispute concerning the posts of Assistant Prosecution Officer in Uttar Pradesh. The appellant, an alleged contemnor before the Allahabad High Court’s Lucknow Bench, challenged an interim order rejecting his compliance affidavit and requiring compliance with the writ court’s directions, failing which he was to appear personally for further proceedings, including the framing of charges.
The appellant maintained that the writ court had directed consideration of the respondents’ candidature and that the authorities had complied by passing a reasoned rejection order dated 2 September 2026. He argued that the contempt court could not examine the correctness of that rejection or use contempt proceedings to grant substantive relief beyond the writ court’s directions. The Supreme Court, however, confined its examination to whether a Special Appeal was available before the High Court and expressly left these merits open.
Applying Midnapore Peoples’ Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Chunilal Nanda and Ajay Kumar Bhalla v. Prakash Kumar Dixit, the Court distinguished an appeal against punishment for contempt under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, from an intra-court appeal against an order adjudicating substantive rights. The unavailability of an appeal under Section 19 against an order not imposing punishment does not, by itself, exclude an otherwise maintainable intra-court appeal.
The Bench identified illustrative situations in which such an appeal may lie, subject to the governing appellate provisions and the order satisfying the test of a judgment. These include orders rejecting a purported compliance decision after examining its correctness and requiring compliance afresh; directions extending beyond the original order; and decisions on disputed questions of fact or law that finally determine the parties’ rights. Routine procedural orders do not become appealable merely because they arise in contempt proceedings.
Rejecting a blanket reliance on the criminal-jurisdiction exclusion in Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952, the Court explained that contempt jurisdiction is sui generis. Its quasi-criminal features do not convert civil contempt proceedings into ordinary criminal proceedings. Maintainability depends on the jurisdiction actually exercised and the substance of the impugned order.
The Court separately expressed disagreement with the reasoning in Ram Kishan Fauji, a three-Judge Bench decision. It questioned whether treating writ proceedings with a criminal subject matter as an exercise of criminal jurisdiction improperly restricts intra-court appeals. The Bench observed that Article 226 confers an original, extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction and raised concerns that excluding an intra-court remedy in matters involving personal liberty could impair access to justice by compelling litigants to approach the Supreme Court.
Recognising that Ram Kishan Fauji was a larger-Bench precedent, the Court referred questions concerning its correctness and reconsideration to an appropriate Bench.
Decision: The Supreme Court disposed of the appeal without examining the challenge to the contempt order on merits. It permitted the appellant to present a Special Appeal before the Allahabad High Court within a fortnight, leaving all merits open for the appellate Bench.