Mere Lip Service to Marital Obligations Cannot Defeat Proven Desertion: Supreme Court Dissolves Marriage After Two Decades of Separation

Case Name: Bijendra v. Rekha

Date of Judgment: 2 September 2026

Citation: 2026 INSC 939

Bench: Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice Shree Chandrashekhar

Held: The Supreme Court held that a spouse’s bare assertion of being willing to fulfil marital obligations is insufficient to disprove desertion when their conduct demonstrates a deliberate and continuous abandonment of the matrimonial relationship. Desertion under Section 13(1)(ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 requires the factum of separation and the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end, or animus deserendi. So far as the deserted spouse is concerned, the separation must be without consent and without conduct furnishing reasonable cause to the other spouse to leave the matrimonial home. These elements may be inferred from the parties’ conduct and the surrounding circumstances.

Where a spouse refuses, without reasonable cause, to return to the matrimonial home despite an effort by the other spouse to resume cohabitation, and the parties thereafter remain continuously separated for a substantial period, the conduct may establish the requisite intention to desert. Although preserving marriage remains an important objective of matrimonial law, courts should not compel parties to remain bound to a marriage that has long ceased to exist in substance and is beyond any realistic possibility of restoration.

Summary: The appellant-husband, Bijendra, and the respondent-wife, Rekha, were married on 23 June 2003. According to the husband, the wife distanced herself from him soon after the marriage because of his educational qualifications and insulted him by calling him “illiterate” and “rustic.” He alleged that during approximately two years of marriage, she stayed with him only four or five times and that the marriage could not be consummated because of her conduct. On 30 November 2005, the wife returned to her parental home. The husband went there on 15 December 2005 to bring her back, but she refused to accompany him. The parties thereafter remained continuously separated, and no child was born from the marriage.

On 20 June 2007, the husband instituted divorce proceedings under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act on the grounds of cruelty and desertion. The Trial Court found that the allegations concerning denial of sexual relations, abusive language and insults directed at the husband and his family had not been satisfactorily proved. It therefore rejected the ground of cruelty. On desertion, however, the Trial Court accepted that the wife had refused to return with the husband on 15 December 2005 and had thereafter lived separately. Despite recording this finding, it dismissed the divorce petition on the ground that separate residence alone did not entitle the husband to a decree of divorce.

The High Court dismissed the husband’s appeal. While acknowledging that the parties had been living separately since 15 December 2005, it held that physical separation by itself did not constitute desertion. According to the High Court, the husband had failed to prove animus deserendi, particularly because the wife had stated in her testimony that she remained willing to discharge her marital obligations and had never rejected the husband as her spouse.

The Supreme Court observed that the fact of continuous separation since December 2005 was undisputed. It reiterated that desertion does not merely mean physical withdrawal from a particular place; it represents withdrawal from the marital relationship and repudiation of the obligations arising from marriage. Desertion is a continuing course of conduct, and the requisite intention must be inferred from the entire factual background, including the conduct of the parties before and after separation.

The Court found that the husband, accompanied by his witness Ram Prakash, had gone to the wife’s parental home to bring her back, but she refused to accompany them without reasonable cause. The evidence of this witness remained unchallenged. Therefore, the wife’s statement during the proceedings that she was willing to fulfil her marital obligations could not outweigh her actual conduct. Her continued refusal to return and the prolonged absence of cohabitation demonstrated that she had actively chosen to abandon the matrimonial relationship.

Relying upon Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli, the Supreme Court observed that although matrimonial law seeks to preserve marriage, the law must acknowledge the reality of a relationship that has irretrievably ceased to function. Where parties have remained separated for a sufficiently long period, it may reasonably be inferred that the marital bond is beyond repair. Refusing to sever the legal tie in such circumstances does not preserve the sanctity of marriage; instead, it prolongs the hardship and misery of the parties.

The Court also referred to Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan, in which prolonged separation was recognised as an important factor while determining whether a marriage had become incapable of restoration. It clarified, however, that the present appeal was not being decided by invoking the Supreme Court’s extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution. The marriage was dissolved on the statutory ground of desertion under Section 13(1)(ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act.

The Supreme Court concluded that the wife had abandoned the matrimonial relationship and that the husband had successfully established desertion.

Decision: The Supreme Court partly allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court’s finding that desertion had not been proved. The marriage between Bijendra and Rekha, solemnised on 23 June 2003, was dissolved by a decree of divorce under Section 13(1)(ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The findings rejecting the husband’s allegation of cruelty were left undisturbed.

The husband was directed to pay ₹7,00,000 to the wife as permanent alimony by depositing the amount before the Trial Court within three months from the date of judgment. In case of default, the wife was permitted to initiate execution proceedings for recovery, and the unpaid amount would carry interest at nine per cent per annum. No order as to costs was passed.