No ‘Second Bite at the Apple’ Through FIR Quashing After Anticipatory Bail Fails: Punjab and Haryana High Court Rejects Plea by Accused Remaining at Large

Case Name: Mukesh Kumar v. State of Haryana and Others

Date of Judgment: 3 September 2026

Citation: CRM-M No. 7841 of 2025

Bench: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sumeet Goel

Held: The Punjab and Haryana High Court held that an accused whose anticipatory bail application has been rejected on merits, with such rejection subsequently affirmed by the Supreme Court, cannot remain at large and immediately invoke the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction to seek the substantially wider relief of quashing the FIR on the same factual foundation, in the absence of any material change in circumstances. Such a course amounts to an attempt to obtain indirectly what could not be secured directly, undermines judicial finality and constitutes an abuse of the process of law. The Court clarified, however, that this principle is not an absolute or permanent bar: a quashing petition may become entertainable upon a radical change in circumstances or after the accused submits to the process of law. The converse also does not apply, as dismissal of an FIR-quashing petition does not, by itself, bar a subsequent application for anticipatory bail because the two remedies are governed by different legal thresholds.

Summary: The petitioner, who had served as Estate Officer-I, Haryana Shehari Vikas Pradhikaran, Gurugram, approached the High Court under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, seeking quashing of two FIRs registered by the Anti-Corruption Bureau. The FIRs invoked Sections 409, 418, 420, 467, 468 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code and provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The petitioner also challenged the approval granted under Section 17-A of the Prevention of Corruption Act and sought an independent investigation into the role of various officers.

The criminal proceedings concerned the alleged restoration and re-allotment of three SCO sites in Sector 23-A, Gurugram. The properties had originally been auctioned in 1997, but their allotments were cancelled in 1998. Appeals, revisions and review proceedings filed by the concerned allottees were subsequently dismissed. In 2018, applications were moved for restoration of the sites.

The petitioner maintained that, while serving as Estate Officer-I, he merely acted upon directions issued by superior officers. According to him, verification of the official record showed that the original allotment letters had remained undelivered. He consequently issued provisional and conditional allotment letters that were expressly subject to approval by the Chief Administrator, HSVP. Those conditional allotments were subsequently cancelled or withdrawn. The petitioner also relied upon a vigilance inquiry report which, according to him, recorded that no financial loss had been caused to the Government.

The prosecution alleged that the petitioner, in connivance with other officials and private parties, restored or re-allotted the commercial sites after a considerable lapse of time at the old rates, thereby conferring an undue benefit upon private parties and causing wrongful loss to HSVP. It was further alleged that he acted without obtaining the approval of the competent authority and played an active role in the re-allotments.

The petitioner had earlier sought anticipatory bail in connection with the FIRs. Although interim protection was initially granted and he joined the investigation, the High Court dismissed his anticipatory bail applications on merits on 20 March 2024. His challenge before the Supreme Court was also dismissed on 16 April 2024. Despite these orders, the petitioner neither surrendered nor applied for regular bail. Instead, he invoked the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court to seek quashing of the FIRs.

The principal question before the Court was whether an accused could maintain an FIR-quashing petition after his anticipatory bail application had been rejected on merits and the rejection had attained finality, while he continued to remain beyond the reach of the investigating process.

The High Court acknowledged that anticipatory bail and FIR quashing operate in distinct legal fields. However, they cannot be examined in complete isolation from the factual circumstances and conduct of the litigant. Rejection of anticipatory bail on merits gives judicial legitimacy to the continuation of the investigation and reflects a prima facie assessment that the allegations may warrant custodial interrogation. An immediate attempt to move from the rejection of protection against arrest to the larger relief of extinguishing the prosecution, without any material change in circumstances, was described as legally paradoxical.

The Court observed that seeking quashing immediately after failing to obtain anticipatory bail amounted to taking a “second bite at the apple.” Such a manoeuvre was not merely a misuse of legal procedure but an affront to judicial finality because it required the Court to reconsider substantially the same position under a differently framed relief. The petitioner’s conduct in neither surrendering nor making himself available for investigation was characterised as a “hit and try stratagem” intended to keep the criminal process in suspended animation.

The Bench further held that rejection of anticipatory bail cannot be treated as a licence to remain in abscondence while simultaneously seeking equitable and extraordinary relief. A litigant who remains in defiance of the process of law cannot demand its discretionary protection. The mere alteration in the form or nomenclature of the relief sought does not create a fresh entitlement to invoke the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction.

At the same time, the Court drew an important distinction in the reverse situation. Dismissal of a petition seeking quashing of an FIR does not automatically prevent the accused from subsequently seeking anticipatory bail. Quashing permanently terminates the prosecution and is governed by an exceptionally high threshold, whereas anticipatory bail provides temporary protection of personal liberty and depends upon considerations such as the necessity of arrest and custodial interrogation.

Decision: The High Court dismissed the FIR-quashing petition as not entertainable at that stage. The dismissal was expressly made “for the nonce,” while reserving liberty to the petitioner to approach the Court again if a fresh cause of action arose after he submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the criminal process.