“No Leave, No Suit, No Interim Relief”: Supreme Court Rules That Receiver Cannot Be Appointed Before Grant of Leave Under Section 92 CPC

Case Name: S. Panchalingu & Others v. People’s Education Trust (R) & Others Etc.

Date of Judgment: 18 September 2026

Citation: 2026 INSC 1010

Bench: Justice Manoj Misra and Justice Manmohan

Held: The Supreme Court held that a civil court presented with a plaint under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, along with an application seeking leave to institute the suit, has no jurisdiction to pass protective or preservatory interim orders while the leave application remains pending. Grant of leave is a mandatory condition precedent to the institution of a suit concerning a public charitable or religious trust. Until leave is granted, there is no validly instituted suit, no lis before the court and, consequently, no proceeding in which interlocutory relief can be granted.

A receiver cannot be appointed under Section 94 read with Order XL Rule 1 CPC before the grant of leave. Supplemental proceedings necessarily presuppose an existing substantive proceeding and cannot be used to bypass the statutory gateway prescribed by Section 92. Section 141 CPC also cannot extend procedural provisions in a manner that overrides the substantive protection granted to public trusts.

The Court further held that Section 151 CPC cannot be invoked to create jurisdiction where none exists. Inherent powers supplement existing jurisdiction but cannot override the express statutory mandate of Section 92. Characterising the appointment of a receiver as merely “protective” or “preservatory” does not cure the absence of jurisdiction. Such an appointment is intrinsically intrusive because it dislodges the existing management of the trust even before the court determines whether the proposed suit should be permitted.

However, where compelling urgency exists, the court may dispense with notice to the proposed defendants and grant leave ex parte by recording cogent reasons. Once leave is granted, the suit comes into existence and appropriate interim orders may then be passed. The defendants remain entitled to seek revocation of the leave so granted.

Summary: The dispute concerned the management of People’s Education Trust. The appellants filed a plaint under Section 92 CPC together with an application seeking leave to institute the suit. While the leave application was pending, the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Mandya, passed an order under Order XL Rule 1 and constituted an ad hoc committee comprising the existing trustees to manage the Trust’s day-to-day affairs.

The Karnataka High Court set aside that order, holding that a suit under Section 92 remained “stillborn” until leave was granted and that the civil court had no jurisdiction to pass interlocutory orders during the pre-leave stage. The appellants approached the Supreme Court, contending that a court could not remain a mute spectator while public trust property was exposed to possible mismanagement or dissipation.

The Supreme Court examined the conflicting views adopted by different High Courts. The Allahabad, Bombay, Kerala and Madras High Courts had recognised a protective jurisdiction pending grant of leave, whereas the Orissa and Karnataka High Courts had held that no such jurisdiction existed.

The Court affirmed the Karnataka High Court’s view. It explained that Section 92 is a special provision governing representative suits brought in the interest of beneficiaries of public charitable or religious trusts. It functions both as a “remedial sword”, enabling interested persons to act against breach or mismanagement, and as a “protective shield”, guarding public trusts and their resources against vexatious litigation.

The expression “having obtained the leave of the Court” makes prior leave indispensable. An application for leave is merely a threshold proceeding and not a substantive proceeding in which the parties’ rights can be adjudicated. Consequently, neither Section 94, Order XL Rule 1, Section 141 nor Section 151 CPC authorises a court to appoint a receiver or issue any other interim protective order before leave is granted.

The Court rejected the argument that appointing a receiver merely preserves the trust property. It observed that receivership displaces the existing management and may seriously prejudice the trust if leave is eventually refused. Permitting such an order would defeat the very protection Section 92 was designed to provide.

At the same time, the Court recognised that genuine emergencies may require immediate judicial intervention. In such cases, the proper course is to grant leave ex parte after recording compelling reasons and then consider interim relief. Ordinarily, notice should precede the grant of leave, but absence of prior notice does not render the suit invalid, as the affected parties may apply for revocation of leave.

Decision: The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and upheld the Karnataka High Court’s decision setting aside the Trial Court’s order constituting an ad hoc committee for the Trust. It conclusively held that no protective or preservatory interim order can be passed before leave under Section 92 CPC is granted.