Punjab & Haryana High Court: Order IX Rule 7 CPC Cannot Be Used to Reopen Trial at the Fag End Without ‘Good Cause’; Munadi Valid After Repeated Failed Service Attempts, Delayed Challenges to Ex Parte Proceedings Dismissed
Case Name: Smt. Surinder Kaur and Another v. Smt. Jinder Pal Kaur and Others
Date of Judgment: 28 September 2026.
Citation: CR No.2685 of 2026
Bench: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Deepak Gupta
Held: The Punjab and Haryana High Court held that an application under Order IX Rule 7 CPC requires the defendant not only to appear before or at an adjourned hearing but also to establish good cause for the earlier non-appearance. The provision does not confer an automatic right to reopen proceedings merely because valuable property rights are involved. Where a defendant had knowledge of the proceedings, was represented through counsel, remained absent without satisfactory explanation and approached the Court after substantial delay, the ex parte proceedings cannot be undone as a matter of course.
The Court further held that service by Munadi is not inherently invalid or obsolete. Where repeated attempts at ordinary service have failed and the Court thereafter directs substituted service under Order V Rule 20 CPC, such service is legally effective. Order V Rule 20(2) expressly treats substituted service as effectual as personal service. The Court distinguished cases where Munadi had been resorted to merely as a matter of convenience without genuine prior attempts at personal service.
The Court also emphasised that supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is limited and discretionary. The High Court does not sit as an appellate court to reappreciate evidence or substitute its own view for a plausible view taken by the trial court. Interference is warranted only in cases of patent jurisdictional error, flagrant disregard of law or perversity resulting in grave injustice.
On the facts, the Court found that both sets of defendants had failed to show sufficient or bona fide cause for their prolonged absence. The first set approached the High Court almost three years after the trial court’s order without satisfactory explanation, while the second set moved to set aside the ex parte proceedings about three years and nine months after the ex parte order and only after the plaintiffs’ evidence had already concluded. The Court held that procedural provisions are intended to advance justice, not to permit parties having knowledge of proceedings to indefinitely stall a suit.
Summary: The civil revisions arose from a suit instituted on 24 March 2019 seeking a mandatory injunction for vacation of a six-marla portion of House No.1268, Sector 8-C, Chandigarh, along with recovery of use and occupation charges. Defendant Nos.1 and 2 were proceeded against ex parte on 17 January 2020, while defendant Nos.3 and 4 had earlier been proceeded against ex parte on 26 August 2019.
Defendant No.1 moved an application on 3 October 2022 for setting aside the ex parte proceedings, claiming advanced age, illness, stay with her daughter at Gurugram during the Covid period and illness of her son. The application was dismissed by the trial court on 1 April 2023. Significantly, the High Court noted that defendant No.2 had never filed any application before the trial court for setting aside the ex parte order and, therefore, could not obtain such relief for the first time merely by joining the revision petition.
The revision against the order dated 1 April 2023 was itself instituted only on 20 March 2026, nearly two years and eleven months later. The High Court held that such unexplained delay disentitled the petitioners from discretionary relief under Article 227. The timing of the challenge was also treated as significant because defendant Nos.1 and 2 approached the High Court only after the litigation concerning the application of defendant Nos.3 and 4 had progressed substantially.
On merits, the record showed that defendant No.1 had been personally served on 27 March 2019, defendant No.2 had also been served, and counsel had appeared on their behalf on several dates. Despite repeated opportunities, no written statement was filed, and on 17 January 2020 neither the defendants nor their counsel appeared. The Court therefore held that they were fully aware of the suit.
The reliance upon the Covid-19 pandemic was also rejected because the nationwide lockdown began only on 25 March 2020, more than two months after the ex parte order dated 17 January 2020. The Court further noted that no medical record had been produced before the trial court to substantiate the pleaded ailments or residence at Gurugram, and the same counsel who had appeared in 2019 subsequently filed the application in 2022 without any explanation for his absence on the crucial date.
As regards defendant Nos.3 and 4, their application for setting aside the ex parte order was filed on 31 May 2023. The Court clarified that the application was not barred merely because the plaintiffs’ evidence had been closed, since the trial court record showed that the matter was still fixed for arguments and had not yet been finally reserved for judgment. Thus, the principle that Order IX Rule 7 ceases to apply after completion of hearing did not by itself render the application non-maintainable.
However, the Court stressed that the application had been moved at the fag end of the trial, after the plaintiffs had completed their evidence. Such an application, the Court held, required strict scrutiny of the cause shown for non-appearance.
The contention that service through Munadi was ineffective was rejected. The Court found that service had repeatedly been attempted at House No.1267, Sector 8-C, Chandigarh—the admitted residence of the defendants and the address used by them in earlier litigation. Service attempts were made on numerous dates between March and July 2019, and only thereafter did the trial court order substituted service by Munadi, which was effected on 29 July 2019. The Court held that this was precisely the situation contemplated by Order V Rule 20 CPC.
The Court also rejected the plea that defendant Nos.3 and 4 had no knowledge of the proceedings until May 2023. Their close relationship with defendant Nos.1 and 2, common connection with the adjoining property and the fact that all four defendants had earlier appeared through common counsel in litigation concerning the same property supported the inference that they had knowledge of the suit. Their claim that they first learnt of the proceedings from an unnamed family friend was found unconvincing.
Their plea that they had been residing in Madhya Pradesh was also found vague and unsupported. Ownership of land in Jabalpur did not establish residence there during the relevant period, and the medical documents relied upon related to a period almost two years after the ex parte order.
The High Court further observed that the application had been filed around three years and nine months after the ex parte order, with no specific explanation for this delay and without even a prayer for condonation. The fact that their application had earlier been allowed twice did not assist them because both those orders had subsequently been set aside by the High Court and therefore ceased to have legal existence.
In its concluding observations, the Court noted a pattern in which different defendants approached the courts at different stages, resulting in a suit filed in March 2019 remaining stuck at the stage of final arguments for over three years after the plaintiffs’ evidence had closed. The Court remarked that procedural provisions of the CPC are meant to further justice and cannot be employed by parties having knowledge of proceedings to indefinitely prolong litigation.
Decision: The Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissed the Civil revisions, finding no ground for interference under Article 227 of the Constitution.
The Court, however, clarified that in terms of Bhanu Kumar Jain v. Archana Kumar, the defendants would remain free to participate in the proceedings from the stage at which the suit presently stood and could address arguments on the basis of the material already on record. They could not, however, be restored to the position existing before the ex parte orders.