Punjab & Haryana High Court Alters Section 304 Part II Charge to Section 304-A IPC in Chandigarh PG Fire Tragedy: Knowledge, Not Mere Negligence, Is the Test for Section 304 Part II IPC

Case Name: Nitesh Bansal v. State of U.T., Chandigarh

Date of Judgment: 30 July 2026

Citation: CRR-1695-2021

Bench: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Virinder Aggarwal

Held: The Punjab and Haryana High Court held that serious lapses in fire safety, overcrowding, structural modifications, narrow passages, absence of emergency exits, and failure to provide firefighting equipment may prima facie constitute rash and negligent conduct, but such omissions do not automatically establish the knowledge required for an offence of culpable homicide under Section 304 Part II IPC.

For framing a charge under Section 304 Part II IPC, the prosecution material must prima facie demonstrate that the accused committed the act with knowledge that death was a likely consequence. Where the allegations merely show negligence in maintaining premises and failure to comply with safety standards, without material indicating that the accused knew that operating the premises in that condition was likely to cause death, the appropriate charge is under Section 304-A IPC.

The Court therefore set aside the charge under Section 304 Part II IPC and substituted it with a charge under Section 304-A IPC, while retaining the charges under Sections 336 and 338 read with Section 34 IPC.

Summary: The criminal revision arose from a devastating fire that broke out on 22 February 2020 at a paying guest accommodation situated in Sector 32-D, Chandigarh. Three young women, namely Riya, Pakshi and Muskaan, died in the incident, while two other occupants sustained burn injuries.

The prosecution alleged that the petitioner, Nitesh Bansal, was operating the paying guest accommodation in premises leased from co-accused Gaurav Aneja. The building had allegedly been partitioned into several small cubicles using fibre sheets and wooden structures to accommodate as many as 33 female residents. It was further alleged that the internal passages and staircases were narrow, ventilation was inadequate, windows and emergency exits were absent, and no fire extinguishers or other firefighting equipment had been installed.

The Trial Court framed charges against the petitioner and the owner of the premises under Sections 304, 336 and 338 read with Section 34 IPC. The petitioner challenged the order principally on the ground that the allegations, even if accepted in their entirety, disclosed negligence rather than culpable homicide.

The petitioner argued that the essential ingredient distinguishing Section 304 Part II IPC from Section 304-A IPC is the accused’s knowledge that the act was likely to cause death. According to him, the prosecution material did not show that he had such knowledge. The incident was described as an accidental fire, allegedly originating from a laptop charger, and there was no allegation that the petitioner intended to cause death or knew that death was a probable consequence of operating the premises.

The State opposed the revision and maintained that the petitioner had consciously disregarded the safety of the residents by overcrowding the premises, making combustible structural alterations, blocking or omitting evacuation routes, and operating the establishment without basic fire safety arrangements. It contended that such reckless disregard justified the framing of a charge under Section 304 IPC.

The High Court examined the distinction between culpable homicide under Section 304 Part II IPC and causing death by negligence under Section 304-A IPC. It relied substantially upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in Keshub Mahindra v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Sushil Ansal v. State through CBI. In those cases, despite grave structural, operational and fire safety lapses leading to mass casualties, the Supreme Court held that Section 304 Part II could not be invoked unless the material showed that the accused had knowledge that their acts were likely to cause death.

The Court also referred to Rajesh Aggarwal v. State of Haryana, where a fire in an illegally operated factory with defective electrical systems and a locked emergency exit resulted in the deaths of seven employees. In that matter, the charge was altered to Section 304-A IPC because the record did not establish that the accused knew that running the factory would probably cause death.

Applying the same principle, the High Court found that the material collected during investigation did not prima facie show that Nitesh Bansal operated the paying guest accommodation with the knowledge that death of its occupants was a likely consequence. The allegations undoubtedly reflected serious negligence in maintaining the premises and ensuring compliance with fire and safety norms, but they did not satisfy the higher mental element required under Section 304 Part II IPC.

The Court also considered it legally inconsistent that the surviving victims’ injuries arising from the same incident had resulted in charges under Sections 336 and 338 IPC, which are based on rashness and negligence, whereas the deaths were treated as culpable homicide under Section 304 Part II IPC. Since the injuries and deaths arose from the same alleged conduct and factual matrix, the Court found no sufficient basis to apply different standards of criminal culpability.

Accordingly, the High Court held that the prosecution case, at its highest, disclosed an offence of causing death by negligence under Section 304-A IPC and not culpable homicide under Section 304 Part II IPC.

Decision: The criminal revision petition was allowed. The charge framed against Nitesh Bansal under Section 304 Part II IPC was set aside. The corresponding charge against co-accused Gaurav Aneja, the owner of the premises, was also set aside. Both accused were instead directed to face trial under Section 304-A IPC, along with Sections 336 and 338 read with Section 34 IPC. Since an offence under Section 304-A IPC is triable by a Magistrate, the Sessions Judge, Chandigarh, was directed to transmit the matter to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chandigarh, for trial by the competent court.