Case Name: Sandeep Kumar v. Satpaul Malra and Others
Date of Judgment: 11 August 2026
Citation: CR-8079-2019
Bench: Hon’ble Mr Justice Deepak Gupta.
Held: The Punjab and Haryana High Court held that the mere presence of a photocopy on the judicial file neither proves that an original document existed nor establishes that the photocopy was prepared from such original. Before secondary evidence can be admitted under Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the party relying upon it must lay a proper factual foundation showing the existence and execution or authorship of the original and satisfactorily explaining its loss, destruction or non-availability under one of the statutory contingencies. Mere relevance of the document, its non-availability on the court file or an allegation that the original was “perhaps” destroyed cannot substitute this mandatory foundation. The Court further reiterated that admissibility of secondary evidence is distinct from proof of the document’s genuineness, correctness and contents.
Summary: The plaintiff filed a civil revision challenging an order dated 26 November 2019 by which the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Chandigarh, had permitted defendant No. 1 to lead secondary evidence in respect of a photocopy of a purported property visit report. The underlying dispute concerned a flat in Sector 48-C, Chandigarh. According to the plaintiff, defendant Nos. 1 and 2 received ₹14 lakh as earnest money without disclosing that the flat was mortgaged with Cholamandalam Finance & Investment Co. Ltd. The defendants maintained that the plaintiff and his wife already knew about the mortgage and sought to rely upon the property visit report to show that the plaintiff’s wife was present when officials of the financial institution inspected the flat.
The trial court permitted secondary evidence principally because the photocopy was already present on the judicial file and the original could not be produced even after an official of the financial institution was summoned. The High Court found this reasoning legally unsustainable. It observed that the existence of a photocopy is conceptually different from proof of the existence and subsequent loss or destruction of its original. No categorical evidence or finding showed when, by whom or under what circumstances the original property visit report had been destroyed. The assertion that the financial institution had “perhaps” destroyed it after redemption of the mortgage was insufficient to satisfy Section 65.
Relying upon Smt. J. Yashoda v. Smt. K. Shobha Rani, (2007) 5 SCC 730, Ashok Dulichand v. Madahavlal Dube, (1975) 4 SCC 664, and Rakesh Mohindra v. Anita Beri, (2016) 16 SCC 483, the High Court emphasised that relevance cannot cure inadmissibility and that an allegation of forgery becomes relevant only after the statutory foundation for receiving secondary evidence has first been established. Even when secondary evidence is admitted, its admission does not by itself prove the authenticity, contents or evidentiary value of the document.
Decision: The High Court allowed the revision petition, set aside the trial court’s order and dismissed defendant No. 1’s application under Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. It nevertheless granted liberty to defendant No. 1 to file a fresh application after establishing the necessary factual foundation regarding the original document’s existence, execution or authorship and its loss, destruction or non-availability. Any such application was directed to be decided independently without treating the High Court’s observations as a determination of the document’s genuineness or evidentiary value.