“POCSO Presumption Cannot Turn a Broken Prosecution Case into Proof”: Supreme Court Acquits Man as Medical and Forensic Evidence Negated Sexual Assault
Case Name: Deepak in JC v. State Government of NCT of Delhi
Date of Judgment: 17 September 2026
Citation: 2026 INSC 1008
Bench: Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice N.V. Anjaria
Held: The Supreme Court held that the presumptions under Sections 29 and 30 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, are rebuttable and do not permit courts to mechanically accept the prosecution’s version as gospel truth. The statutory presumption arises only after the prosecution establishes the foundational facts constituting the alleged offence.
Sections 29 and 30 merely shift the evidential burden to the accused; they do not relieve the prosecution of its initial obligation to present credible evidence. The accused may rebut the presumption through cross-examination, contradictions in prosecution evidence, absence of relevant proof, inconsistency between ocular and medical evidence, scientific evidence, statutory defences or any other material showing the improbability of the prosecution case.
The Court held that even where the statutory presumption initially operates, it may disappear by the conclusion of the trial if the prosecution evidence is found to be inherently inconsistent, improbable or medically unsupported. A court must assess the entire evidence objectively and cannot allow itself to be overshadowed by the reverse-burden provisions while deciding an issue involving personal liberty.
In the present case, the testimony of the child’s mother and the private doctor contained material contradictions regarding the time of examination, the persons accompanying the child and the alleged presence of blood. The subsequent medical examination found no injury or abnormality, the hymen was intact, and the forensic report detected neither blood on the child’s pyjami nor semen or male DNA on any exhibit. The Court held that the medical and forensic evidence did not merely fail to corroborate penetration but negated the very theory of sexual assault.
Summary: The prosecution alleged that the appellant took a two-and-a-half-year-old girl from near her home to Hans Raj City Park on 9 December 2015. According to the child’s mother, after being brought home, the child cried while attempting to urinate and allegedly indicated that the appellant had sexually assaulted her. The mother claimed that blood was found on the child’s pyjami.
An FIR was registered on 11 December 2015. Owing to her tender age, the child could not make a statement under Section 161 CrPC. The prosecution therefore principally relied upon the testimony of the child’s mother, her uncle and a private doctor whom the family had allegedly consulted after the incident.
The Trial Court convicted the appellant under Section 363 IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act. He was sentenced to ten years’ rigorous imprisonment for the POCSO offence and one year’s rigorous imprisonment for kidnapping. The Delhi High Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the witnesses corroborated one another and that the presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act operated against the accused.
The Supreme Court found serious defects in this approach. The mother claimed that she took the child to the private doctor at approximately 9:30 p.m. along with her husband, whereas the doctor stated that the mother came alone at about 4 or 5 p.m. The doctor prepared no treatment papers, provided no medical treatment and claimed to have informed the police, but no police witness confirmed receiving such a call.
The mother also made material improvements over her earlier version. Certain facts narrated during trial, including the precise allegation of penetrative assault, did not appear in the FIR. Her testimony was therefore not of the unassailable quality required of a “sterling witness” whose evidence could independently sustain conviction.
The medical examination found no injury, bloodstain, abnormality or damage to the child’s hymen. The forensic expert confirmed that no blood was detected on the pyjami and that no semen or male DNA was found on any exhibit. In the peculiar facts of the case, the Court held that this evidence ruled out the prosecution’s theory of penetrative sexual assault.
The defence also established that the complainant’s family and the appellant’s family had previously quarrelled over a common water connection serving their adjoining dwellings. Given the contradictions and the complete absence of medical or forensic support, the Court accepted the defence case that prior enmity supplied a probable motive for a false complaint.
The Court emphasised that an accused must be convicted because the evidence legally proves guilt, not because the accusation concerns a grave or socially abhorrent offence. Public interest lies in convicting those proved guilty, while the interests of both the public and the accused demand acquittal where guilt cannot be established.
Decision: The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and set aside the Delhi High Court’s judgment dated 3 July 2025 as well as the Trial Court’s conviction and sentence. The appellant was acquitted of the offences under Section 363 IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act.