Priority in Absorption Is No Licence to Leapfrog Merit: Punjab and Haryana High Court Quashes Seniority Granted to Lower-Merit Surplus Employees

Case Name: Naib Singh and Another v. State of Punjab and Others

Date of Judgment: 3 September 2026

Citation: CWP No. 14243 of 2001

Bench: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Moudgil

Held: The Punjab and Haryana High Court held that priority granted to surplus employees for consideration or absorption does not automatically confer superior seniority after they enter the receiving cadre. Once surplus employees and other selected candidates are appointed to the same cadre and join on the same date, their inter se seniority must be determined strictly according to the applicable statutory service rules. Executive instructions regulating priority in absorption cannot override a statutory rule protecting the merit determined by the Selection Committee. Accordingly, lower-merit surplus employees could not be placed above higher-merit candidates merely because they had been sponsored for absorption before the direct recruitment process.

Summary: The petitioners invoked the writ jurisdiction of the High Court to challenge the seniority list dated 11 August 2000, under which private respondents Nos. 3 and 4 were placed above them in the cadre of Technical Assistants. They also challenged the consequential promotion of those private respondents to the post of Research Officer through an order dated 25 November 1999. The petitioners sought preparation of a fresh seniority list under Rule 10 of the Punjab State Planning Board (Class III) Service Rules, 1988, based upon the merit determined by the Departmental Selection Committee.

The petitioners and private respondents were appointed as Technical Assistants against posts advertised on 16 April 1991 and joined the cadre on the same date. The petitioners contended that they had secured higher marks than private respondents Nos. 3 and 4 and were, therefore, entitled to be placed above them in accordance with the proviso to Rule 10, which expressly provides that the order of merit determined by the competent Board shall not be disturbed.

The State justified the impugned seniority arrangement by relying upon Government instructions dated 14 May 1991. Those instructions required surplus employees of the Industries Department to be considered for absorption before resorting to direct recruitment. The names of private respondents Nos. 3 and 4 had been forwarded by the Industries Department as surplus employees, whereas the petitioners were sponsored through the Employment Exchange and considered subsequently.

The petitioners argued that the Government instructions were issued after the recruitment advertisement and dealt only with priority in consideration or absorption. They did not provide that surplus employees, after their appointment to the same cadre, would rank senior to candidates who had secured higher merit in the common selection process. The petitioners also maintained that they possessed the requisite qualifications to be considered in the surplus category, but their names had not been forwarded due to a mistake attributable to the Industries Department.

The High Court examined Rule 10 of the 1988 Rules, under which seniority in a cadre is ordinarily determined according to the length of continuous service. Its proviso specifically declares that where members are recruited by direct appointment and join within the stipulated period, the order of merit determined by the Board shall not be disturbed. The Court found that the Rule did not treat the date of appointment as the sole consideration but expressly protected the candidates’ comparative merit.

The Court noted that the post of Technical Assistant was required to be filled entirely through direct recruitment under Appendix B to the 1988 Rules. Irrespective of the process through which their names were initially sponsored, the petitioners and private respondents ultimately entered the same cadre pursuant to the selection conducted against the advertisement dated 16 April 1991 and joined the posts on the same date.

Drawing a clear distinction between absorption and seniority, the Court held that a policy granting priority to surplus employees at the entry stage could not be treated as conferring an overriding right to seniority after appointment. The instructions dated 14 May 1991 did not state that a surplus employee would rank above a higher-merit candidate once both were appointed to the same cadre. Nor did those instructions amend or displace Rule 10 of the statutory 1988 Rules.

The Court relied upon Rajni Kant Ojha v. State of Bihar, (2015) 15 SCC 172, in which the Supreme Court distinguished the source of an employee’s earlier selection from the rules governing seniority in the cadre into which the employee was subsequently inducted. It also referred to S.S. Thakore v. State of Gujarat, 1991 SCC OnLine Guj 354, which held that priority in accommodating surplus employees does not, in the absence of a statutory provision, carry with it a right to superior seniority in the receiving cadre.

The High Court further drew support from its earlier judgment in Ram Saran Goyal v. State of Punjab, CWP No. 7003 of 2000, decided on 4 October 2013. That case arose from the same recruitment advertisement and involved the same private respondents. The Court had held there that priority status could not justify disturbing the merit-based order of seniority protected by Rule 10.

The Bench observed that neither the 1988 Rules nor the Government instructions authorised the State to create two artificial classes within the same cadre for determining seniority. Executive instructions may regulate the manner in which surplus employees are considered or absorbed, but they cannot override statutory service rules. Accepting the State’s interpretation would allow candidates with lower marks to acquire seniority solely because of their priority category, rendering the express protection of merit under Rule 10 meaningless.

The writ petition had remained pending since 2001. During its pendency, the petitioners were promoted as Research Officers and subsequently retired from service. Their claim, therefore, survived in relation to retrospective or notional seniority, deemed promotion and recalculation of their retiral and consequential benefits.

Decision: The High Court allowed the writ petition and quashed the seniority list dated 11 August 2000 to the extent it placed private respondents Nos. 3 and 4 above the petitioners. Their consequential promotion to the post of Research Officer dated 25 November 1999, founded upon the erroneous seniority position, was also quashed.

The Court directed that the petitioners be treated as senior to the private respondents and be considered notionally promoted to the post of Research Officer with effect from 25 November 1999. Since the petitioners had already retired, the State was directed to refix their seniority and promotion notionally and redetermine their retiral and consequential benefits within two months. Actual monetary benefits were left to be calculated in accordance with law, considering that the petitioners had not discharged the duties of the higher post during the intervening period.