Case Name: State of Punjab and Others v. Gurjeet Singh
Date of Judgment: 14 September 2026
Citation: RSA No. 4599 of 2009
Bench: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Harkesh Manuja
Held: The Punjab and Haryana High Court held that the true nature of a termination order must be determined from the material and circumstances that led to its issuance, and not merely from the language or form in which it is expressed. An employer cannot disguise a punitive termination as a discharge simpliciter to avoid compliance with the principles of natural justice.
A contractual or service condition permitting the discharge of a Special Police Officer without notice may validly be invoked where the termination is genuinely simpliciter, such as when the employee’s work or conduct is found unsatisfactory. However, where specific allegations of misconduct constitute the foundation of the decision, the employee must be served with a show-cause notice, afforded an opportunity of hearing and subjected to an appropriate inquiry before adverse action is taken.
The distinction between the “motive” and “foundation” of termination is decisive. Where allegations merely influence the employer’s assessment of a temporary employee’s suitability, they may operate as the motive for a simpliciter discharge. Conversely, where those allegations are expressly relied upon and form the very basis of the removal, the termination becomes punitive, irrespective of the innocuous wording of the final order.
The Court held that the respondent’s discharge was founded upon the registration of a criminal case, his period of custody and an allegation that he had produced a false medical certificate. Since his service record was otherwise satisfactory, these allegations were not incidental considerations but formed the foundation of the termination. The discharge could not, therefore, have been effected without notice, inquiry and an opportunity of hearing.
Summary: The State of Punjab filed a regular second appeal challenging the judgment and decree dated 9 June 2009 passed by the Additional District Judge, Patiala. The First Appellate Court had reversed the trial court’s judgment dated 1 March 2006 and decreed the civil suit instituted by the respondent, Gurjeet Singh, against the termination of his services.
Gurjeet Singh was appointed as a Special Police Officer on 30 August 1994 and was posted with the Government Railway Police at Bathinda. On 13 July 1998, he was selected for appointment as a Constable in the 5th Battalion, Indian Reserve Battalion, Amritsar, and was called for medical examination on 13 March 2000.
An FIR had been registered against him on 13 January 1997 under Sections 307, 323, 324, 148 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code at Police Station Kotwali, Bathinda. Although the CID character-verification report did not initially disclose anything adverse, the registration of the criminal case was reflected in the service record obtained from the Government Railway Police. Consequently, the respondent was not permitted to join as a Constable and continued working as an SPO.
By an order dated 6 October 2000, the respondent was discharged from service. He alleged that the order had been passed without issuing any show-cause notice or granting him an opportunity of hearing. He contended that his services could not be terminated merely because a criminal case had been registered against him and instituted a civil suit seeking a declaration and consequential relief.
The State defended the termination by asserting that the respondent had been appointed as an SPO under Section 17 of the Police Act, 1861 on a daily-wage basis. Under the conditions governing his engagement, his services could be terminated at any time without prior notice, and he possessed no vested right to continue on the post.
The State maintained that information regarding the criminal case had been conveyed by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, CID, Bathinda, through a letter dated 24 April 2000. Acting upon the directions issued by the Director General of Police, Punjab, the competent authority discharged the respondent in accordance with the conditions of his engagement.
The trial court accepted the State’s position and dismissed the suit on 1 March 2006. The First Appellate Court reversed that decision on 9 June 2009 and decreed the respondent’s suit, resulting in the State’s regular second appeal before the High Court.
The principal question before the High Court was whether the order dated 6 October 2000 constituted a genuine discharge simpliciter under the terms of the respondent’s engagement or was, in substance, a punitive order founded upon allegations of misconduct.
The High Court examined the communication dated 21 September 2000 issued by the Director General of Police, Punjab, which preceded and resulted in the discharge order. That communication specifically referred to the criminal case registered against the respondent, his custody between 14 February and 28 February 1997 and the allegation that he had produced a false medical certificate. It thereafter directed his discharge.
The Court also took note of the admission made by DW-2 that no show-cause notice had been issued to the respondent and that his service record was otherwise satisfactory. This admission demonstrated that unsatisfactory performance was not the reason for terminating his engagement.
Relying upon Mathew P. Thomas v. Kerala State Civil Supply Corporation Ltd. and Others, (2003) 3 SCC 263, the High Court observed that even where a termination order appears innocuous on its face, the Court may examine its background and surrounding circumstances to determine whether misconduct was its actual foundation. The outward form of a termination order cannot prevent judicial scrutiny of its real character.
The Court also referred to Surinder Pal Kaur v. State of Punjab and Others, 2005 (1) SCT 106, which held that although an SPO may be discharged without notice for unsatisfactory work and conduct, an order founded upon a specific allegation of misconduct is punitive and requires an inquiry and opportunity of hearing.
Reliance was further placed upon State of Punjab and Others v. Dharam Pal, 2015 (3) SCT 633, which similarly distinguished a discharge simpliciter from a stigmatic removal. Where the discharge is based upon alleged misconduct, the power to terminate without notice cannot be invoked to bypass procedural safeguards.
The State relied upon Parveen Kumar v. State of Punjab, 2001 (3) RSJ 206, to argue that a temporary daily-wage employee could be discharged without disciplinary proceedings. The High Court distinguished the decision, observing that it applied to a genuine discharge simpliciter and not to a case where misconduct formed the very basis of termination.
The State’s reliance upon Sher Singh v. State of Haryana, 1994 (2) SLR 100, was also found misplaced. That case concerned the discharge of a constable under Rule 12.21 of the Punjab Police Rules during the prescribed period of enrolment. In the present case, the respondent had never been permitted to join as a Constable and was discharged from his existing engagement as an SPO.
The Court also rejected the State’s reliance upon Delhi Administration v. Sushil Kumar, (1996) 11 SCC 605. Although a candidate’s antecedents are relevant when determining suitability for appointment to a disciplined force, no adverse material had been produced against the respondent apart from the registration of the criminal case. The respondent was subsequently acquitted on 5 January 2001.
The Court concluded that the criminal case, custody and allegation concerning the false medical certificate were not peripheral circumstances. They were the reasons for which the respondent was discharged. The termination was therefore punitive and could not be sustained in the absence of notice, proof of the allegations and an opportunity of hearing.
Decision: The Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissed the State’s regular second appeal and upheld the judgment and decree dated 9 June 2009 passed by the First Appellate Court in favour of Gurjeet Singh.
The Court found no illegality or perversity in the finding that the discharge order dated 6 October 2000 was punitive in nature and had been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice.