Rejection of Section 156(3) CrPC Application Is No Shield Against a Subsequent FIR: Supreme Court Refuses to Quash Job-for-Money Fraud Case
Case Name: Pramod Kumar Shukla v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others
Date of Judgment: 19 August 2026
Citation: 2026 INSC 887
Bench: Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice N.V. Anjaria
Held: The Supreme Court held that rejection of an application under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not bar the police from subsequently registering an FIR on the same or substantially similar allegations when the information discloses a cognizable offence. An order under Section 156(3) merely determines whether the Magistrate should direct an investigation; it does not adjudicate the truth of the allegations or finally determine the rights and liabilities of the parties. Therefore, such rejection does not attract the principle of res judicata and cannot extinguish the police’s independent statutory duty under Sections 154 and 156 CrPC to register and investigate a cognizable offence.
Summary: The complainant alleged that the appellant represented that he had influence in the Directorate of Education, Prayagraj, and could secure clerical appointments for the complainant’s son and grandson upon payment of ₹20 lakh. Certain amounts were allegedly transferred to the appellant’s bank account, but no interview or appointment followed. It was further alleged that the appellant supplied forged admit cards and examination results and later threatened the complainant when repayment was demanded.
Before registration of the FIR, the complainant had approached the Magistrate under Section 156(3) CrPC. The Magistrate rejected the application after considering a police report which indicated that the dispute related to a land transaction rather than payment for securing public employment. The revision against that order was also dismissed. Subsequently, FIR No. 405 of 2024 was registered against the appellant under Sections 406, 419, 420, 467, 468, 471, 504 and 506 IPC.
The appellant sought quashing of the FIR, contending that the earlier rejection of the Section 156(3) application prohibited a second round of criminal proceedings on substantially identical allegations. He further asserted that the monetary transactions arose from property dealings and that the alleged agreement to secure public employment was unlawful under Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act.
The Supreme Court rejected these arguments. It explained that proceedings under Section 156(3) are concerned with directing or declining an investigation and do not result in a trial or final adjudication upon the merits of the allegations. Consequently, rejection of such an application neither determines the complainant’s credibility nor prevents the police from registering an FIR when cognizable offences are subsequently disclosed.
The Court clarified that res judicata may apply in criminal proceedings where an issue has been conclusively adjudicated, such as after a lawful trial and acquittal. However, it does not apply to a threshold order rejecting a request for investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC.
The Court also distinguished Mohan Karthik v. State of Tamil Nadu, observing that the said case concerned the maintainability of a second application under Section 156(3) after an earlier application and closure report. The present case involved the independent power and duty of the police to register an FIR under Section 154 CrPC and not a second application before the Magistrate.
Decision: The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the Allahabad High Court’s refusal to quash FIR No. 405 of 2024 and the consequential criminal proceedings. It held that the allegations required investigation and that the appellant’s factual defences could not be adjudicated at the FIR-quashing stage.