Magistrate Cannot Bypass Section 195 CrPC by Directing Police to Register FIR under Section 174-A IPC: Punjab and Haryana High Court Quashes Proceedings after Withdrawal of Cheque-Bounce Complaint

Case Name: Hardeep Kaur Sidhu v. State of Punjab and Another

Date of Judgment: 21 August 2026

Citation: CRM-M-37719-2024

Bench: Hon’ble Mrs Justice Manisha Batra

Held: The Punjab and Haryana High Court held that although an offence under Section 174-A IPC is an independent and substantive offence, continuation of such proceedings may amount to abuse of process where the underlying complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, has been settled and withdrawn.

The purpose of proceedings under Section 174-A IPC in such circumstances is to secure the accused’s presence in the principal complaint. Once the parties have compromised the dispute and the principal complaint itself no longer survives, continuing the consequential criminal proceedings would ordinarily serve no useful purpose.

The Court further held that Section 195(1)(a)(i) CrPC bars a court from taking cognizance of an offence under Section 174-A IPC except upon a written complaint by the concerned public servant or a public servant to whom that person is administratively subordinate. The fact that Section 174-A IPC is classified as a cognizable offence does not displace the mandatory procedure prescribed under Section 195 CrPC.

Accordingly, after declaring a person proclaimed, a Magistrate cannot simply direct the police to register an FIR under Section 174-A IPC. The prescribed course is to institute a written complaint before the competent court in conformity with Section 195 CrPC. Proceedings initiated solely through a police FIR at the Magistrate’s direction, without the statutorily required complaint, stand vitiated.

Summary: The petitioner, Hardeep Kaur Sidhu, approached the Punjab and Haryana High Court under Section 482 CrPC seeking quashing of FIR No. 21 dated 20 February 2023, registered under Section 174-A IPC at Police Station Phul, District Bathinda, together with all consequential proceedings.

Respondent No. 2 had instituted a complaint against the petitioner and another accused under Sections 138 and 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. During the pendency of the cheque-bounce complaint, the petitioner was declared a proclaimed person by an order dated 8 February 2023. Pursuant to that order, the impugned FIR under Section 174-A IPC was registered on 20 February 2023.

The petitioner contended that she had not been properly served in the principal complaint and was unaware of its pendency. Subsequently, the parties amicably resolved their dispute. On 13 October 2023, the complainant made a statement before the Trial Court confirming the compromise and expressing his intention not to pursue the complaint. The Trial Court consequently dismissed the complaint as withdrawn on the same date.

The petitioner argued that once the principal proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act had ended through compromise and withdrawal, continuing the FIR under Section 174-A IPC would amount to an abuse of the judicial process.

The State opposed the petition on the ground that the FIR was registered because of the petitioner’s continuous absence before the Trial Court. Respondent No. 2, however, remained unrepresented before the High Court.

The High Court identified the principal issue as whether proceedings under Section 174-A IPC should continue after the underlying complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act had been settled and withdrawn.

The Court referred to the Supreme Court’s decision in Daljit Singh v. State of Haryana, 2025 INSC 21, which recognises Section 174-A IPC as an independent and substantive offence capable of surviving even after the proclamation under Section 82 CrPC ceases to operate. However, the Supreme Court had nevertheless quashed the Section 174-A IPC FIR in that case after considering, among other circumstances, that the underlying cheque-bounce complaint had been settled and withdrawn.

The High Court also relied upon Mohammad Hanif Attari v. State of Haryana, Baldev Chand Bansal v. State of Haryana, Vikas Sharma v. Gurpreet Singh Kohli, Microqual Techno Limited v. State of Haryana, Rajneesh Khanna v. State of Haryana, Ashok Madaan v. State of Haryana, Smriti v. State of Haryana and Narinder Pal Singh v. State of Punjab.

These decisions establish that although Section 174-A IPC creates an independent offence, continuing the prosecution may be unjustified where the FIR arose solely from the accused’s absence in a private complaint that has subsequently been settled and withdrawn.

Applying these principles, the Court observed that the purpose behind initiating proceedings under Section 174-A IPC was to secure the petitioner’s presence in the cheque-bounce complaint. Once the dispute was compromised and the complaint was withdrawn, allowing the FIR to continue would not achieve any meaningful legal purpose.

The High Court additionally examined the bar contained in Section 195 CrPC. Relying on Pardeep Kumar v. State of Punjab, it held that Section 195(1)(a)(i) expressly covers offences punishable under Sections 172 to 188 IPC, including Section 174-A IPC.

Therefore, even though Section 174-A IPC is cognizable, a court cannot take cognizance except upon a written complaint from the concerned public servant or a public servant to whom that person is administratively subordinate. A Magistrate cannot circumvent this requirement by merely directing the Station House Officer to register an FIR.

In the present case, the FIR was registered pursuant to directions issued by the Trial Court after declaring the petitioner a proclaimed person. No written complaint, as contemplated under Section 195 CrPC, was instituted before the competent court. The High Court consequently held that the very initiation of the proceedings was contrary to the mandatory statutory procedure.

The combination of the withdrawal of the principal cheque-bounce complaint and the failure to comply with Section 195 CrPC rendered the continuation of the FIR an abuse of process and a miscarriage of justice.

Decision: The High Court allowed the petition and quashed FIR, registered under Section 174-A IPC at Police Station Phul, District Bathinda, along with all subsequent proceedings arising from it.