Executing Court Cannot Import an Unwritten Payment Deadline into Specific Performance Decree: Punjab and Haryana High Court Rejects Judgment-Debtor’s Attempt to Defeat Execution

Case Name: M/s Arlington Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd., New Delhi v. Bhawani Dass (Deceased) through His Legal Representatives and Another

Date of Judgment: 24 August 2026

Citation: CR-4706-2026

Bench: Hon’ble Mr Justice Deepak Gupta

Held: The Punjab and Haryana High Court held that a decree-holder cannot be treated as having defaulted in depositing the balance sale consideration within a particular period when the decree itself prescribes no such time limit.

The three-month period stipulated in the decree was expressly attached to the obligation of the defendants to execute and register the sale deed. It could not be construed as a corresponding direction requiring the plaintiff-decree-holder to deposit the balance consideration within the same period. A judgment-debtor cannot defeat the execution of a final decree by importing into its operative part a condition that it does not contain.

The Court further held that permitting the decree-holder to deposit the balance sale consideration did not amount to rewriting the decree or mechanically extending a time limit. The Executing Court had merely facilitated the enforcement of a decree that had attained finality.

The absence of separate notice before permitting the deposit was also held insufficient to warrant interference, as the judgment-debtor failed to demonstrate any prejudice, failure of justice or jurisdictional error.

Summary: The dispute arose from a suit instituted by Bhawani Dass seeking possession through specific performance of an agreement to sell dated 14 February 2005 against M/s Arlington Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd. and its Director. The Trial Court dismissed the suit on 31 March 2011. On appeal, the Additional District Judge, Palwal, reversed the dismissal and decreed specific performance on 25 February 2012.

The appellate decree recorded that the plaintiff was entitled to have the sale deed executed upon payment of the balance sale consideration of ₹92,50,000, along with stamp and registration expenses. It directed the defendants to execute and register the sale deed within three months from the date of judgment, failing which the plaintiff was entitled to take legal recourse.

The defendants challenged the decree through RSA-2320-2012 and RSA-2177-2012. Both second appeals were dismissed by the High Court on 15 December 2025. The Special Leave Petition was dismissed by the Supreme Court on 20 February 2026, followed by dismissal of the review petition on 11 July 2026. The decree for specific performance consequently attained finality.

During execution, the decree-holder sought permission to deposit the balance sale consideration. The Executing Court allowed the application on 20 January 2026. The judgment-debtor challenged that order, contending that the decree-holder was required to deposit the amount within three months of the appellate decree, that the alleged period expired on 24 May 2012, and that no stay of the decree operated during that period. It was also argued that permission was granted without affording the judgment-debtor an opportunity of hearing.

The High Court rejected these contentions after examining the operative portion of the decree. It found that the three-month period was imposed exclusively upon the defendants for execution and registration of the sale deed. Although the plaintiff’s entitlement was conditional upon payment of ₹92,50,000, the decree fixed no time within which that payment had to be deposited.

The Court distinguished Prem Jeevan v. K.S. Venkata Raman, observing that the decree in that case expressly required the plaintiff to deposit the balance consideration within a stipulated period. That principle could not be mechanically applied where the decree contained no corresponding payment deadline.

The Court acknowledged that, under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, extension of time for payment is discretionary and must depend upon the decree-holder’s conduct and surrounding circumstances. However, the present application did not seek an extension of a period fixed by the decree. It merely sought permission to deposit the amount to facilitate execution of the final decree. Therefore, the absence of a separate application under Section 28 was not fatal.

The Court also noted that the judgment-debtor itself challenged the decree before the expiry of the three-month period and subsequently pursued remedies before the High Court and the Supreme Court. At no earlier stage did it seek rescission or annulment of the decree on the ground that the decree-holder had failed to deposit the balance consideration within time.

On the objection concerning lack of notice, the Court held that no interference was warranted in the absence of demonstrated prejudice or failure of justice. Since the deposit was merely consequential to execution of the decree, the alleged absence of separate notice did not invalidate the Executing Court’s order.

Reiterating the limited scope of supervisory jurisdiction, the High Court held that interference with an execution order is justified only when the subordinate court acts without jurisdiction, fails to exercise jurisdiction vested in it, or commits a patent error resulting in manifest injustice. None of those grounds was established in the present case.

Decision: The High Court dismissed the petition and upheld the Executing Court’s order permitting the decree-holder to deposit the balance sale consideration.

It clarified that the judgment did not adjudicate any objection concerning the mode of execution. The Executing Court was directed to proceed strictly in accordance with the decree and the applicable law.