Case Name: Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz & Others v. Government of Karnataka & Others
Citation: Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 10338 of 2023; 2025 INSC 3
Date of Judgment: 2 January 2025
Bench: Justice B.R. Gavai and Justice K.V. Viswanathan (DB)
Held: The Supreme Court held that landowners whose properties were acquired for the Bengaluru–Mysuru Infrastructure Corridor Project cannot be left remediless merely because of extraordinary delay in passing awards. The Court ruled that compensation must reflect the market value at the time of award, not merely at the time of the preliminary notification, where the delay is attributable to the acquiring authority and spans over two decades. The Court emphasized that the right to property, though no longer a fundamental right, remains a constitutional and human right under Article 300-A, and just compensation is inseparable from lawful acquisition.
Summary: The appellants had purchased residential sites in Gottigere village in the 1990s, which were later notified for acquisition under the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act for the Bengaluru–Mysuru Infrastructure Corridor. Although preliminary and final notifications were issued in 2003, possession was taken in 2005 without passing awards for many years. An award was eventually made only in April 2019, adopting guideline values of 2011 on the basis of the Advocate General’s opinion. This was challenged both by the project proponents, who objected to the higher compensation, and by landowners, who argued that after 18 years they were entitled to compensation at current rates. A Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court quashed the 2019 award but held that the market value must be taken as on the preliminary notification date, not shifted to a later year. The Division Bench dismissed the landowners’ appeal as premature, saying their claim could be examined after fresh awards were made.
Before the Supreme Court, the appellants argued that shifting the notification date was necessary to avoid grave injustice, relying on Ram Chand v. Union of India (1994), Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC (2013), and other precedents where Courts moulded relief in exceptional cases of delay. The respondents contended that only the Supreme Court or High Court could in exceptional circumstances shift the notification date, not the acquisition authorities. The Court agreed that the SLAO had no power to shift dates on his own but found merit in the appellants’ grievance that after more than 20 years no effective compensation had been paid. Surveying earlier precedents, the Court reiterated that when possession is taken decades before awards are made, it is unjust to freeze compensation to outdated values. It affirmed that compensation must be real, fair, and just, consistent with Article 300-A.
Decision: The Supreme Court quashed the Division Bench’s judgment dismissing the writ appeal as premature. It directed that compensation for the appellants’ lands be determined on the basis of the market value as on the date closest to the award rather than the preliminary notification, thereby moulding relief in line with the principle of fair compensation. The Court thus ensured that the landowners were not deprived of property rights without just recompense, while leaving the acquisition itself undisturbed.