Absence of a Valid Marriage Is No Shield Against Section 498A: Supreme Court Extends Cruelty Law to Marriage-Like Live-In Relationships Where Intent to Marry Exists

Case Name: Dr. Lokesh B.H. & Others v. State of Karnataka & Another

Date of Judgment: 3 August 2026

Citation:  2026 INSC 784

Bench: Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh

Held: The Supreme Court held that Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 is not confined exclusively to cruelty committed within a formally valid marriage. The expression “husband” must receive a purposive interpretation so as to include a male partner in a live-in relationship that qualifies as a “relationship in the nature of marriage”, provided that the intention of the parties to marry is established as an intrinsic feature of the relationship.

The Court, however, clarified that Section 498A does not apply to every live-in relationship. The relationship must possess characteristics resembling marriage, such as voluntary and sustained cohabitation, a shared household, social representation as a couple, financial arrangements and other indicators of a stable domestic partnership. In addition, because Section 498A is a penal provision, the parties must have possessed the requisite intention to take the relationship towards matrimony.

The initial burden of establishing the existence of such an intention rests upon the female live-in partner invoking the protection of Section 498A. A higher threshold is necessary because criminal liability cannot be imposed merely because a relationship satisfies the broader civil-law understanding of a “relationship in the nature of marriage” under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.

The Court held that denying Section 498A protection solely because the parties were not formally married would create an artificial distinction having no rational nexus with the statutory object of preventing cruelty within a domestic household. Such a distinction would offend Article 14 of the Constitution.

The Court further held that the civil remedies available under the Domestic Violence Act cannot be treated as an adequate substitute for Section 498A. The Domestic Violence Act is primarily remedial and civil in character, whereas Section 498A carries criminal deterrence against cruelty.

At the same time, the Supreme Court recognised the possibility of misuse of Section 498A and directed strict compliance with the safeguards laid down in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar. Neither the live-in partner nor his relatives may be arrested automatically. A preliminary enquiry must be conducted, the necessity of arrest must be independently assessed, and the statutory safeguards governing arrest and detention must be scrupulously followed.

The Court expressly confined this expanded interpretation to Section 498A IPC alone, stating that it would not automatically affect or enlarge the meaning of expressions used in other statutory provisions.

Summary: The appeals arose from two criminal proceedings initiated by respondent no. 2, Smt. Theertha, against Dr. Lokesh B.H. and members of his family. The woman alleged that she and Dr. Lokesh had married according to Hindu customs and rituals on 17 October 2010 and had thereafter resided together in Bengaluru.

The appellant disputed the very existence of a valid marriage. He contended that Section 498A IPC could apply only where the complainant was the legally wedded wife of the accused. Since, according to him, there was no valid marriage, neither he nor his relatives could be prosecuted as the “husband” or “relatives of the husband” under the provision.

The dispute resulted in two criminal cases. One charge-sheet was filed under Section 498A IPC. The other involved offences under Sections 498A, 504, 506, 307, 494 and 149 IPC, along with Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.

The Karnataka High Court refused to quash the proceedings. It held that the word “husband” in Section 498A could not be given an unduly technical meaning that would permit a man to evade criminal liability after representing himself as a husband and maintaining a relationship possessing the attributes of marriage.

Before the Supreme Court, the appellants and the Union of India argued that Section 498A is a penal provision and must be interpreted strictly. According to them, extending the word “husband” to a live-in partner would amount to judicially creating an offence that Parliament had not expressly enacted. They maintained that women in live-in relationships already had remedies under the Domestic Violence Act and other penal provisions.

The complainant, the State of Karnataka and the amicus curiae supported a purposive interpretation. They argued that a man who assumes the position of a husband, induces a woman to enter a marriage-like domestic arrangement and thereafter subjects her to cruelty cannot be permitted to avoid prosecution merely by questioning the legal validity of the marriage.

The Supreme Court examined the principles of strict construction of penal statutes and purposive statutory interpretation. It observed that strict construction does not necessarily mean blind literalism. A penal statute must be interpreted fairly according to its text, context and legislative objective, without either extending criminal liability beyond permissible limits or defeating the evident purpose of the provision.

Section 498A was introduced in 1983 to combat cruelty towards women within domestic and matrimonial households. The Court held that its reformative and socially beneficial object would be frustrated if a man who functioned as a husband within a marriage-like relationship could escape liability solely because the marriage was invalid, void, disputed or not formally solemnised.

The Court relied upon the purposive approach adopted in Reema Aggarwal v. Anupam, under which a man who enters a marital arrangement and subjects the woman to cruelty cannot hide behind the technical invalidity of the marriage. The Court also considered earlier decisions explaining the meaning of a “relationship in the nature of marriage” under the Domestic Violence Act.

Such relationships may be assessed through factors including the duration of the relationship, residence in a shared household, pooling of financial resources, domestic arrangements, public representation as spouses, socialisation as a couple, the existence of children and the overall intention and conduct of the parties. The factors are indicative and not exhaustive.

The Supreme Court nevertheless drew a distinction between the civil protection available under the Domestic Violence Act and the criminal consequences of Section 498A. A relationship that qualifies for civil remedies under the Domestic Violence Act will not automatically attract Section 498A. For criminal liability, the relationship must also carry a demonstrable intention to marry.

The Court reasoned that not all live-in relationships mimic marriage. Parties may consciously choose a domestic partnership without ever intending to marry. Such relationships cannot be equated with marriage for imposing penal consequences under Section 498A merely because they satisfy some features of a domestic relationship.

Accordingly, only live-in relationships that are in the nature of marriage and are accompanied by the requisite intention to marry fall within the extended protection of Section 498A. The initial burden of showing such intention lies upon the woman seeking to invoke the provision.

Applying the law to the present case, the Court noted the allegations that Dr. Lokesh had concealed an earlier marriage, represented himself as the complainant’s husband, subjected her to dowry-related harassment along with his family members and caused physical injuries, including burns on her leg.

At the stage of considering quashing under Section 482 CrPC, the Court was required to take the allegations at face value. Whether the parties had actually married, whether the relationship possessed the necessary marital characteristics and whether the alleged acts of cruelty occurred were questions requiring evidence at trial.

Since the allegations prima facie disclosed cognizable offences, the case did not satisfy the established grounds for quashing criminal proceedings. The Supreme Court therefore declined to terminate the prosecution.

Decision: The Supreme Court declined to quash the criminal proceedings against Dr. Lokesh B.H. and the other accused. The Trial Court was permitted to continue the proceedings in accordance with law.

The Court clarified that its observations concerning the factual allegations were confined to deciding whether the proceedings deserved to be quashed and would not constitute findings on the merits of the criminal cases.

The appeals were disposed of with the following controlling principles:

Section 498A IPC applies to a live-in relationship that qualifies as a relationship in the nature of marriage and is accompanied by an intention to marry. The relationship must be between consenting adults. This interpretation is confined to Section 498A and does not automatically extend to other provisions. The initial burden of proving the intention to marry lies upon the female live-in partner. The safeguards against automatic arrest laid down in Arnesh Kumar must be strictly applied, and no live-in partner or relative should be arrested without the required preliminary enquiry and assessment of necessity.

All pending applications were disposed of.