Supreme Court Sets Aside FIR Quashing on Limitation; Reaffirms Limitation Runs from Date of Complaint/FIR, Not Cognizance

Held: The Supreme Court held that for the purpose of computing limitation under Section 468 CrPC, the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or initiation of criminal proceedings, including lodging of FIR, and not the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance, and that quashing of proceedings on the basis of delay in taking cognizance is legally unsustainable.

Summary: The case arose from cross-FIRs relating to an altercation, where the FIR filed by the appellant under Sections 323 and 341 IPC was quashed by the Delhi High Court on the ground that the charge-sheet was filed beyond the one-year limitation period and cognizance was taken after expiry of limitation under Section 468 CrPC. The Supreme Court examined the statutory scheme of Chapter XXXVI CrPC and the Constitution Bench decision in Sarah Mathew v. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases, which settled that limitation is to be computed from the date of filing of the complaint or initiation of prosecution, not from the date of cognizance. The Court rejected the distinction sought between complaint cases and police report cases, holding that initiation of criminal proceedings occurs either through filing of a complaint before a Magistrate or lodging of an FIR before the police. It emphasized that delay attributable to the court or investigating agency cannot prejudice a diligent complainant and that the maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit applies. The Court further reaffirmed the binding nature of Constitution Bench precedents and deprecated attempts to re-argue settled legal positions.

Decision: The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the Delhi High Court’s order quashing FIR No. 121 of 2011 on limitation grounds, and directed that the trial proceed expeditiously in accordance with law, with pending applications disposed of.