Supreme Court Sets Aside Remand After 31-Year Delay; Restores Decree and Holds Fraud Allegations Must Be Specifically Pleaded and Proven

Held: The Supreme Court held that a decree cannot be unsettled after an inordinate delay of over three decades on vague and unsubstantiated allegations of fraud, and that non-production of crucial documents by a party invites adverse inference, particularly where the party relies on such documents to establish title.

Summary: The case arose from a suit filed in 1965 seeking declaration of khatedari rights and recovery of possession, which was decreed in 1975 after the defendant participated in proceedings but was later set ex parte. After a delay of 31 years, the defendant challenged the decree alleging fraud and lack of proper opportunity, leading to remand orders by the Revenue Board and affirmation by the High Court. The Supreme Court examined the trial court record and found that the defendant had appeared through counsel, participated in proceedings, and even led evidence, thereby negating allegations of fraud or lack of notice. The Court held that the plea of fraud was vague, inconsistent, and improved at later stages without factual foundation. It further noted that the defendant failed to produce the alleged sale deed forming the basis of her defence, thereby attracting adverse inference under the Evidence Act. The Court also clarified that repudiation of a voidable transaction need not necessarily be through a separate suit and can be effected by conduct, including assertion of title and obtaining a decree. It emphasised that delay condonation cannot be exercised liberally to defeat substantive rights, particularly where the delay is gross and unexplained.

Decision: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders of the Revenue Board and the High Court directing remand, restored the original decree dated 16.08.1975 in favour of the appellant, and held that the challenge after 31 years was untenable, with all pending applications disposed of.