Trustees of Deemed Universities are ‘Public Servants’ under Prevention of Corruption Act

Case Name: State of Gujarat v. Mansukhbhai Kanjibhai Shah

Citation: Criminal Appeal No. 989 of 2018

Date of Judgment: 27 April 2020

Bench: Justice N.V. Ramana, Justice Mohan M. Shantanagoudar, and Justice Ajay Rastogi (concurring)

Held: The Supreme Court held that trustees and officials of “Deemed to be Universities” fall within the definition of “public servant” under Section 2(c)(xi) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The Court ruled that a deemed university performs the same public function as a regular university—imparting education, conferring degrees, and serving public interest—and hence cannot be excluded from the ambit of the Act. The High Court erred in holding otherwise. It further observed that at the stage of discharge under Section 227 CrPC, the trial court should not evaluate evidence in depth but only determine if a prima facie case or grave suspicion exists.

Summary: The respondent, a trustee of Sumandeep Charitable Trust (which manages Sumandeep Vidyapeeth, a deemed university), was accused of demanding ₹20 lakh from a student to permit her to take final exams. Following an FIR, a trap led to the recovery of undated cheques worth over ₹100 crores. The trial court rejected his discharge plea, but the Gujarat High Court quashed proceedings, holding that the trustee was not a “public servant.” On appeal, the Supreme Court clarified that the term “University” in Section 2(c)(xi) PC Act must be purposively interpreted and includes deemed universities. Trustees exercising control over admissions and examinations perform “public duties” attracting the anti-corruption law. The Court emphasized that definitions from the UGC Act cannot restrict the wider social purpose of the PC Act, which targets corruption in any institution performing public functions.

Decision: Appeal allowed. The Supreme Court set aside the Gujarat High Court’s order and reinstated criminal proceedings, holding that the respondent was a “public servant” under Section 2(c)(xi) of the PC Act. The case was remitted for trial, with directions to expedite proceedings.